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ARTICLE
THINGS INVISIBLE TO SEE: STATE ACTION &
PRIVATE PROPERTY©
by: Isaac Saidel-Goley* & Joseph William Singer†
ABSTRACT
This Article revisits the state action doctrine, a judicial invention that shields
“private” or “non-governmental” discrimination from constitutional scrutiny.
Traditionally, this doctrine has applied to discrimination even in places of
public accommodation, like restaurants, hotels, and grocery stores. Born of
overt racial discrimination, the doctrine has inflicted substantial injustice
throughout its inglorious history, and courts have continuously struggled in
vain to coherently apply the doctrine. Yet, the United States Supreme Court
has not fully insulated “private” or “horizontal” relations among persons
from constitutional scrutiny. The cases in which it has applied constitutional
norms to non-governmental actors should be celebrated rather than shunned.
This Article proposes reinterpreting the state action doctrine to mitigate its
historical and contemporary harms. Ultimately, the Authors draw from prop-
erty law theory to contend that the doctrine should be fundamentally reformed
in favor of a more egalitarian conception of the state’s role in ensuring equal
protection of law. The insights of property law theory lead the Authors to
conclude that: (1) equal protection depends on law, not action; (2) common
law is law and, whether it is coercive or permissive, it must comply with the
Equal Protection Clause; and (3) common law that allows discriminatory ex-
clusion from the marketplace violates the Equal Protection Clause. What mat-
ters, for the purposes of constitutional protection, is not “state action” but
whether the law violates the norms of liberty, equality, and dignity recognized
by free and democratic societies.
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“Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment a promise of freedom—freedom to ‘go and come at pleasure’
and to ‘buy and sell when they please’—would be left with ‘a mere
paper guarantee’ if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in
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the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the
hands of a white man.”
—Justice Potter Stewart, 19681
“[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows
individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liabil-
ity, it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may
be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”
—Justice Anthony Kennedy, 20152
“And it would appear beyond question that the power of the State to
create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the
boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
—Chief Justice Fred Vinson, 19483
I. INTRODUCTION
What rights give us the means to live from day to day? What legal
entitlements empower us to move freely, to buy what we need, to live
where we like? What laws must be in place to ensure that we—each of
us—are equally free to pursue happiness? What laws enable us to ac-
quire and enjoy property? What kinds of property rights are compati-
ble with the values and norms of a free and democratic society?
To answer these questions, think about someone who moves from a
state that prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in public accom-
modations to a state where the law empowers public accommodations
to deny service on that basis. Imagine a small town in Alabama where
a man named Dorian just relocated from Massachusetts. Dorian lives
with his husband Henry. Dorian and Henry have been married for
several years, and they have two young children. One evening they get
a babysitter and go out to enjoy a meal at a new restaurant in town.
The restaurant owner sees the two men, concludes that they are gay,
and denies them service, ordering them off the premises. Dorian ref-
uses to leave. The police arrive several minutes later, and arrest Do-
rian for criminal trespass. He is later prosecuted and convicted.
Dorian appeals his conviction to the Alabama Supreme Court.
From a legal perspective, Dorian is in a tough spot. No federal stat-
ute prohibits public accommodations—like restaurants, hotels, gro-
cery stores, or theaters—from denying service on the basis of sexual
orientation.4 Alabama is one of twenty-nine states without a state stat-
1. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
3. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
4. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in “any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” Neither sex nor sexual orientation
is included in the list of protected classes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
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ute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public accommo-
dations.5 The common law of Alabama is also unhelpful.6 No law
gives Dorian the right to eat at a restaurant if the owner refuses to
serve gay customers. Owners are free to exclude him because of his
sexual orientation, and he could face criminal punishment if he resists
exclusion.
The absence of a law regulating the restaurant does not mean that
we are in a state of nature where no law exists. In fact, the law is
palpably present in the form of the law enforcement officers who ar-
rested and punished Dorian for exercising the same right to eat in a
restaurant as is customarily enjoyed by straight people. The law is evi-
dent in granting the restaurant owner the right to exclude someone
because of their sexual orientation. Both the recognition of discrimi-
natory exclusion from a public place as a valid property right and the
enforcement of that right by coercive state action would seem to in-
volve government choices about the allocation of rights in land and
the legitimacy of competing claims. And while such a law may seem
permissive to the restaurant owner, Dorian experienced that law as
coercive as he sat in his jail cell.
When Dorian gets his day in court, he will argue that his discrimina-
tory exclusion, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. He will argue that the state violated the
Equal Protection Clause by authorizing places of public accommoda-
tion to exclude LGBTQ patrons and by enforcing the discriminatory
demands of the restaurant owner. He will argue that the state cannot
authorize public accommodations to engage in invidious discrimina-
tion without denying him equal protection of the law.
Under current law, the Alabama Supreme Court would likely af-
firm Dorian’s conviction, holding that the state action doctrine pre-
cludes Dorian’s Equal Protection Clause claim. Specifically, the
Alabama Supreme Court would explain that governmental authoriza-
tion and enforcement of the restaurant owner’s right to exclude Do-
rian from the restaurant owner’s property does not constitute state
5. See Isaac Saidel-Goley, Article, The Right Side Of History: Prohibiting Sexual
Orientation Discrimination In Public Accommodations, Housing, and Employment, 31
WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y  2, 117, 121 & n.25 (2016).
6. Id. at 122. Compare Florence Hotel Co. v. Bumpas, 60 So. Ala. 566, 568 (Ala.
1915) (holding that innkeepers—unlike other businesses—hold themselves out as
able and willing to entertain guests for hire and have an obligation to do so and such
guests have a right to “insist upon . . . respectful and decent treatment at the hands of
the innkeeper and his servants”) with Banks v. State, 170 So. 2d 417 (Ala. Ct. App.
1964) (state court enforcement of Ala. Code § 426 (1940), allowing a privately owned
pharmacy to discriminate against customers because of their race did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because there was no state action); Messer v. S. Airways
Sales Co., 17 So. 2d 679, 681–682 (Ala. 1944) (holding that the common law duty to
serve applies only to those owners exercising a “public calling” like a transportation
facility or public utility).
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action. Imagine that Dorian appeals that decision to the United States
Supreme Court. He will argue that the state acted—through its com-
mon law, police, prosecutors, and courts—and that the state denied
him equal protection of the law.
Dorian should win that argument. The government violates the
Equal Protection Clause if it grants places of public accommodation
the authority to engage in invidious discrimination. Any common law
rule that denies access to the public marketplace in a way that treats
some people as second-class citizens—authorizing discrimination
without valid justification—violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law.
This may seem like a startling result. To be sure, it does require
reinterpreting or reforming the state action doctrine, at least as ap-
plied to discriminatory exclusion from public accommodations. At the
same time, the existing doctrine can be interpreted to support (1) the
idea that the common law is subject to constitutional constraints; and
(2) the idea that fundamental, constitutional equality-norms prohibit
the recognition and enforcement of property rights which prevent
people from acquiring property for discriminatory reasons.
The Authors’ approach to the state action doctrine and the Equal
Protection Clause rests on insights from property law theory. Ulti-
mately, the Authors propose reforming the state action doctrine and
endorsing a more progressive approach to equal protection—one that
is informed by contemporary principles of property and equality that
are foundational to a free and democratic society. The Authors want
to preserve a private sphere where people are free to make individual-
ized decisions about their associations with others while defining a
public sphere where the state cannot recognize property rights or en-
force rules that deny equal access to the marketplace.
The Constitution protects freedom of association and privacy, and
allows people the room to choose their intimate relations and their
friends in the private sphere of the home, the church, mosque, or syn-
agogue. That does not mean that places open to the public have simi-
lar capacious powers to exclude whomever they wish. Public
accommodations are part of the public world to which free and demo-
cratic societies grant equal opportunity and access. One does not have
to belong to a privileged class or caste to enter the world of the mar-
ket or to obtain private property. In order to be qualified to eat at a
restaurant one does not need to have a particular skin color, ancestry,
sex, or sexual orientation. Free and democratic societies do not recog-
nize ascribed statuses. This means that such societies cannot delegate
power to public accommodation owners to establish such castes by
means of their private property rights.
In Section II, the Authors provide a history of the state action doc-
trine. First, the Authors discuss the origins of the doctrine, which was
developed soon after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The Authors pay particular attention to early cases in which the Su-
preme Court invented the state action doctrine. Second, the Authors
discuss a period of time spanning the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, during which the Court applied a formalistic and inegal-
itarian version of the state action doctrine. Third, the Authors discuss
contemporary state action doctrine cases, from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury to the present day, in which the Court often, but not always, ap-
plied a functional and more egalitarian version of the state action
doctrine. The Authors also highlight the substantial harms of the state
action doctrine. The Authors summarize early cases, in which the doc-
trine’s application caused significant harm to African Americans.
Then the Authors discuss the contemporary harms of the doctrine, fo-
cusing on LGBTQ discrimination in access to places of public
accommodation.
In Section III, the Authors outline several proposals for reinter-
preting the state action doctrine to mitigate the historical and contem-
porary harms caused by the doctrine. Relying on several key state
action cases, the Authors argue that precedent supports the conclu-
sion that courts should find state action in at least the following situa-
tions: (1) when someone is arrested or prosecuted; (2) when a court
issues an order; (3) when the government enforces or encourages a
custom; and (4) when the government makes an allocative decision.
In Part IV, the Authors go a step further and argue that the state
action doctrine should be fundamentally reformed. To ensure equal
protection of law, the analysis must refocus on a more progressive
conception of equal protection informed by contemporary under-
standings of equality and dignity foundational to a free and demo-
cratic society. This new understanding of the state action doctrine
emerges from the Authors’ analysis of property law theory. Private
property cannot exist without state action, including state laws that:
(1) distinguish between valid and invalid property rights; (2) allocate
rights among persons; (3) authorize or prohibit particular property
rights and freedoms; (4) regulate externalities; and (5) correct injus-
tices through equitable principles.
The insights of property law theory lead the Authors to argue that:
(1) equal protection depends on law, not action; (2) common law is
law that must comply with the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is
coercive or permissive; and (3) common law that allows discrimina-
tory exclusion from the marketplace violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Authors conclude by arguing that what matters is not state ac-
tion but whether the law violates the norms of liberty, equality, and
dignity recognized by free and democratic societies that ensure each
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human being the Constitution’s “full promise of liberty.”7 Traditional
doctrine asks “whether there is state action,” and if the answer is no
then the constitutional inquiry is at an end. The Authors argue, in-
stead, that the state is always involved when it recognizes, promotes,
or enforces a common law rule that regulates relationships, whether
those relationships are vertical (between persons and the state) or
horizontal (among persons). In essence, the Authors contend that the
Equal Protection Clause infuses the common law with an equality
principle requiring equal access to places of public accommodation.
Recognition that state common law must comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment does not entail any particular conclusion about whether
the common law rule in question is an unconstitutional deprivation of
equal protection of law. But, the Constitution requires the laws of the
states (including property laws) to protect civil rights. The right to
purchase property or services without regard to sexual orientation is
such a right. Rules that permit a person to refuse to contract with
someone else are as much rules of law as those that compel that ser-
vice be provided. Forcing people to call ahead to see if they are wel-
come in places that serve the general public is a violation of civil
rights. A common law rule that validates and enables discrimination
denies equal protection of the law.
II. HISTORY OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The state action doctrine is the principle that the scope of the
United States Constitution is limited to governmental conduct and
does not extend to the behavior of private persons.8 In other words,
the Constitution applies to vertical relationships between the govern-
ment and private individuals, but not to horizontal relationships be-
tween or among private parties.9 The state action doctrine governs
most of the Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment10 and
the Fifteenth Amendment,11 although the Thirteenth Amendment is a
striking exception to the doctrine.12
7. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015); See Laurence H. Tribe,
Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16 (2015).
8. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503,
507–08 (1985).
9. See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102
MICH. L. REV. 387, 388 (2003).
10. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is [S]tate action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not
the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment.”).
11. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661 (1944) (“The question as to whether
the exclusionary action of the party was the action of the State persists as the determi-
native factor.”).
12. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (“[T]he [Thirteenth] [A]mendment
is not a mere prohibition of [S]tate laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an
absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of
the United States.”).
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The state action doctrine can be clearly and simply defined as fol-
lows: “[T]he Constitution applies only to governmental conduct, usu-
ally referred to as ‘state action.’ The behavior of private citizens and
corporations is not controlled by the Constitution.”13 But, the doc-
trine’s clarity and simplicity begins and ends with its definition. Its
application has been anything but clear and simple. In reality, the doc-
trine, as invented and applied by the Supreme Court over the last 140
years, has proven notoriously incoherent.14 Its incoherence stems both
from the difficulty of defining the difference between state action and
private action and because the distinction is not a sufficient or coher-
ent way to determine when constitutional norms should or should not
apply.
The result of the mismatch between the doctrine and its normative
meaning is both a blurry and incoherent line between state and pri-
vate action. Many cases have applied a formalistic and inegalitarian
interpretation of the state action doctrine, attempting to establish a
bright-line between state action and private action. Many other cases
have applied a more functional and egalitarian version of the doctrine,
recognizing the inherent overlap between state action and private ac-
tion. Navigating these cases and attempting to uncover consistent
trends within the doctrine has proven extremely difficult for scholars
and judges alike.
Professor Black and Judge Friendly both called the doctrine “a con-
ceptual disaster area[,]”15 while Professor Stone called the doctrine “a
shambles.”16 Professor Chemerinsky noted that “scholars [have] per-
suasively argued that the concept of state action never [can] be ration-
ally or consistently applied”17 and concluded that “[t]here still are no
clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”18 Profes-
sors Glennon and Nowak similarly concluded that “there are no gen-
erally accepted formulas for determining when a sufficient amount of
government action is present in a practice to justify subjecting it to
constitutional restraints.”19
The Supreme Court itself conceded that the “cases deciding when
private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a
13. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 507 (footnote omitted).
14. See Kenneth W. Mack, Civil Disobedience, State Action, and Lawmaking
Outside the Courts: Robert Bell’s Encounter with American Law, 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
347, 349 (2014) (arguing that the doctrine was incoherent from the very beginning).
15. Charles Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and Califor-
nia’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Public-
Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1982)
(quoting Charles Black).
16. Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Pri-
vate Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 n.156 (1982).
17. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 505.
18. Id. at 503–04 (1985).
19. Robert J. Glennon & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment “State Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 221 (1976).
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model of consistency[,]”20 and that “to fashion and apply a precise
formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is an ‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court has never at-
tempted.’”21 It is necessary to understand the history of the state
action doctrine in order to see how and why the Court has not been
able to distinguish between state and private action.
In this Section, the Authors outline the history of the state action
doctrine. The Authors begin with the ratification of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and then discuss the Supreme Court’s
invention of the state action doctrine in the late nineteenth century.
Next, the Authors discuss several decades during which the Court ap-
plied a formalistic and inegalitarian version of the state action doc-
trine. Last, the Authors discuss contemporary (post-1940) state action
cases, in which the Court sometimes applied a more functional and
egalitarian conception of the doctrine. The Authors pay particular at-
tention to “public function” and “entanglement” cases, which exem-
plify the Court’s gradual reformulation of the doctrine. The Authors
also show how this functional excursion was curtailed when a con-
servative Court entered the picture. Understanding changing concep-
tions of state action can help situate the doctrine in historical context
as the Court shifted from trying to protect discriminatory practices to
intervening to restrict or prohibit them—and back again.
A. Origins of the State Action Doctrine (1860–1883)
Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in
1865, and the states ratified the Amendment the same year.22 The
Amendment formally abolished slavery throughout the United
States.23 In direct response to the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, states across the South enacted the infamous Black
Codes.24 The Black Codes blatantly circumvented the Thirteenth
Amendment by attempting to restore slavery in all but name. Con-
gress responded to the Black Codes by enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which granted racial equality in areas like property owner-
ship, access to courts, and protection of the law.25 Congress’s pur-
ported constitutional authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
20. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
21. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting Kotch
v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
22. 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery, NAT’L
ARCHIVES,  https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/13th-amendment (last visited
Apr. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LPA7-5GWW].
23. Id.
24. Black Codes, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/black-
codes (last visited Apr. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/377Z-Z9R4].
25. Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the
Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 451, 549–50 (1989).
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Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.26 Facing doubt as to whether
the Thirteenth Amendment was a sufficient source of constitutional
authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress passed the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1866, which the states ratified in 1868.27 In
1870, Congress, pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as Section
18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.28
The United States Supreme Court invented the state action doctrine
shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. The key
constitutional text underlying the state action doctrine is Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.29
In 1875, the Court in United States v. Cruikshank interpreted this
language to limit the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to state
action.30 In Cruikshank, the Court reversed the convictions of several
white supremacists involved in the Colfax massacre in which over a
hundred African Americans were slaughtered.31 The Court applied
the state action doctrine for the first time, holding that “[t]he four-
teenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but the provi-
sion does not  . . . add any thing to the rights which one citizen has
under the Constitution against another.”32
In 1879, the Court in Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rives denied an
appeal from a black defendant arguing that an all-white jury violated
the Equal Protection Clause.33 In part of the opinion, the Court reaf-
firmed its application of the state action doctrine, noting that “[t]he
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . all
have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of
private individuals.”34
26. Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. L. REV. 77, 82–83
(2010).
27. Id.
28. See Kevin Maher, Like a Phoenix From the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to
Travel, and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Comment, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 106 & n.3 (2001).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
31. Id. at 568.
32. Id. at 554–55.
33. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1879). Contra, Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding the Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from
excluding jurors solely because of their race).
34. Id. at 318.
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In 1883, the Court engaged in its first searching judicial inquiry into
the state action doctrine in the seminal Civil Rights Cases.35 In the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited private racial discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation.36 The Court held that Con-
gress lacked the constitutional authority to enact the statute.
First, the Court held that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to limit the action of the states, not private action.37 Thus,
the Court held that the scope of congressional authority pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment was limited to “state action.”38 There-
fore, the Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.39 Second, the Court held that, although the Thirteenth
Amendment was not confined to state action,40 it only abolished slav-
ery and empowered “Congress . . . to pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States.”41 Reasoning that private racial discrimination in public ac-
commodations did not constitute a “badge” or “incident” of slavery,
the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was beyond Con-
gress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.42 Although the
Supreme Court has since abandoned this narrow interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment,43 its application of the state action doctrine
has persisted since the Civil Rights Cases.44
35. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 11 (“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individ-
ual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”).
38. Id. Cf. Mack, supra note 14, at 361 (arguing that the ruling was not focused on
state action but whether the right of access to public accommodations was a “munici-
pal right” or one that had been “federalized by the Civil War Amendments”).
39. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13 (“And so in the present case, until some
State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been
taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any pro-
ceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity.”).
40. Id. at 20. (“The [Thirteenth] [A]mendment is not a mere prohibition of State
laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or
involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 25. (“Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not re-
garded as badges of slavery.”).
43. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (“Surely Congress
has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination
into effective legislation.”).
44. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 508 (“These holdings remain undisturbed:
the Constitution does not prohibit private deprivations of constitutional rights.”).
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B. Formalistic Application of the State Action Doctrine
(1883–1940s)
The state action doctrine has substantially harmed individuals and
groups since its inception in the late nineteenth century. Minority
populations—particularly African Americans—have been especially
vulnerable to the collateral damage of the state action doctrine. As
Professor Charles Black eloquently observed: “‘Separate but equal’
and ‘no state action’—these fraternal twins have been the Medusan
caryatids upholding racial injustice.”45 The doctrine has undermined
the rights and liberties of African Americans and hindered civil rights
reform in myriad ways, particularly within the realms of public accom-
modations, voting rights, and housing. In this Section, the Authors
summarize early cases that highlight some of the historical harms,
which were a direct result of the Court’s formalistic and inegalitarian
application of the state action doctrine from its inception through the
mid-twentieth century.
1. Unequal Access to Public Accommodations
First, the state action doctrine has seriously undermined the liberty
of African Americans to access places of public accommodation—in-
cluding restaurants, grocery stores, retail stores, and theaters. The
state action doctrine facilitated this deprivation at three levels of influ-
ence. At the first level of influence, the Court’s invention of the state
action doctrine in early cases like the Civil Rights Cases insulated pri-
vate racial discrimination from constitutional scrutiny. Private racial
discrimination has harmed, and continues to harm, African Americans
in profoundly damaging ways and has done so throughout American
history. One particularly visible and destructive method of private ra-
cial discrimination has taken the form of discrimination in places of
public accommodation. When the owner or manager of a restaurant,
hotel, or grocery store orders African American patrons off the prem-
ises or subjects them to second-class or offensive treatment because of
their race, the state action doctrine has traditionally placed this dis-
criminatory action beyond the scope of the Constitution.46 Even when
the private owner relies on law—e.g., trespass law—to carry out their
45. Black, supra note 15, at 70. See also id. at 97 (“The Civil Rights Cases are cut
off the same bolt of historical cloth as Plessy v. Ferguson.”); id. at 107 (“The racism
problem, in law, is now principally the ‘state action’ problem; to be slow to recognize
state action, to complicate the concept with unwarranted limiting technicalities, is to
confirm racism pro tanto.”).
46. See, e.g., Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1963) (“It cannot be dis-
puted that under out decisions ‘private conduct abridging individual rights does no
violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in
any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved in it.’”) (quoting
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
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racially discriminatory scheme, the state action doctrine has tradition-
ally shielded the discrimination from constitutional scrutiny.47
At the second level of influence, the Court’s formalistic application
of the state action doctrine directly thwarted congressional prohibi-
tion of private racial discrimination for almost a century. Just seven
years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This statute prohibited private
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation.48 This stat-
ute, passed under authority granted Congress by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, dramatically increased the liberty of African
Americans by granting them equal access to public accommodations
across the United States. Less than a decade later, the Court relied on
the state action doctrine to invalidate the statute, abruptly wrenching
the newfound federal rights out from under millions of African Amer-
icans across the nation.49 African Americans would not enjoy feder-
ally protected equal access to public accommodations until almost a
century later, when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.50
Congress avoided the state action problem because it relied on the
Interstate Commerce Clause instead of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.51
At the third level of influence, the Court’s formalistic application of
the state action doctrine shielded private racial discrimination from
constitutional scrutiny and invalidated the statutory prohibition of pri-
vate racial discrimination. This application likely encouraged state leg-
islatures and courts to remove the last layers of protection granting
African Americans access to public accommodations, i.e., state stat-
utes and state common law. Prior to the Civil War, state common law
“required all businesses that held themselves out as open to the public
to serve anyone who sought service.”52 The earliest cases exempting
places of public accommodation from the general common law duty to
serve were a reaction to the post-Civil War extension of legal rights to
African Americans.53 The extension of legal rights meant that public
accommodations suddenly had the common law duty to allow equal
47. Id. at 249 (“In deciding these cases the Court . . . does not suggest that such
action, denying equal protection, may be found in the mere enforcement of trespass
laws in relation to private business establishments from which the management, of its
own free will, has chosen to exclude persons of the Negro race.”) (internal citations
omitted) (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. See 18 Stat. 335–337 (1875).
49. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
50. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 75 Stat. 241 (Title II).
51. Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (“[T]he action of
the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly
serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.”).
52. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Pri-
vate Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (1996).
53. Id. at 1331–45.
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access to African Americans. In fact, this common law duty was foun-
dational to the Supreme Court’s invention of the state action doctrine
in the Civil Rights Cases. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky noted, “in
announcing the state action doctrine, the Court assumed that the com-
mon law protected against private discrimination and private viola-
tions of rights.”54 Despite the Court’s reliance on this “assumption of
effective common-law protection against private discrimination,”55 af-
ter the Civil Rights Cases, state courts across the nation quickly
changed the common law rule to one that dramatically restricted the
duty to serve and authorized most public accommodations to choose
their customers at will—i.e., to engage in racial discrimination.56 This
retrogressive change in common law was accompanied by a wide-
spread repeal of state public accommodations statutes passed
throughout the South during the height of Reconstruction and their
replacement with Jim Crow laws, explicitly requiring segregation
throughout the South.57
After the reversal of state common law, the promulgation of state
statutes granting nondiscriminatory access to public accommodations,
and the invention of the state action doctrine, private discrimination
against African Americans—even in places of public accommoda-
tion—was insulated from constitutional, statutory, and common law
challenge in every state that interpreted its common law to allow such
discrimination. The Supreme Court effectively placed the coercive
power of the state in the hands of private parties who sought to create
a racial caste system that systemically prevented previously enslaved
persons from exercising liberties taken for granted by the rest of the
population. The state action doctrine allowed states to adopt common
law rules that severely limited African Americans’ access to the mar-
ketplace. The doctrine gave places of public accommodation the au-
thority to defer to the discriminatory wishes of their white customers.
In sum, the Court’s invention of the state action doctrine played a
fundamental role in the maintenance of private racial discrimination,
undermining the rights and liberties of millions of African Americans
for almost a century between the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Impaired Voting Rights
Second, the Court’s formalistic application of the state action doc-
trine seriously undermined the voting rights of African Americans
from the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 until the
mid-twentieth century. After the enactment of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, southern states responded with a striking degree of mass resis-
54. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 515.
55. Id. at 516.
56. See Singer, supra note 52.
57. See id.
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tance, culminating in the effective nullification of the Amendment.58
Their primary weapons of suppression included bribery and violent
intimidation of African American voters.59 This disfranchisement of
African Americans had disastrous and enduring consequences for mil-
lions of African Americans and for the advancement of the civil rights
movement.60
Congress responded to the southern nullification of African Ameri-
cans’ newly extended voting rights by passing the Enforcement Act of
1870.61 The Act was enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment the very year of its ratification and it prohibited private
parties from using bribery or violent intimidation to suppress African
American voters.62 In 1903, the United States Supreme Court in
James v. Bowman invoked the state action doctrine to invalidate key
provisions of the Enforcement Act.63 Specifically, the Court granted a
writ of habeas corpus filed by Henry Bowman, who was indicted for
bribing and intimidating African American voters in violation of the
Enforcement Act of 1870.64 The Court held that the state action doc-
trine prevented Congress from regulating such private behavior under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.65
This formalistic application of the state action doctrine had disas-
trous consequences for black suffrage. It effectively condoned the
southern nullification of the Fifteenth Amendment and directly con-
tributed to the violent disfranchisement of African Americans
throughout the South. It eliminated federal protections against private
58. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 38–39 (2004) (“By 1900, most
white southerners were determined to eliminate black suffrage, even if doing so re-
quired violence and murder. . . . [T]he Fifteenth Amendment, though still part of the
Constitution ‘in the technical sense,’ was ‘already in process of repeal . . . as a . . . rule
of conduct.’”).
59. Id. at 29 (“Through fraud, intimidation, and violence whites eventually suc-
ceeded in suppressing black voting, which enabled Democrats to ‘redeem’ the
South.”).
60. Id. at 32–33 (“Disfranchisement had calamitous consequences for southern
blacks. When blacks could not vote, neither could they be elected to office. No blacks
sat in the Mississippi legislature after 1895, down from a high of 64 in 1873. In South
Carolina’s lower house, which had a black majority during Reconstruction, [only] a
single black [congressman] remained in 1896. The last southern black congressman
until the 1970s, George White of North Carolina, relinquished his seat in 1901. More
important, disfranchisement meant that almost no blacks held local offices. In the late
nineteenth century, sheriffs, justices of the peace, jurors, county commissioners, and
school board members were the most important governmental actors. . . . [T]he pre-
ferred method of denying constitutional rights to blacks was to vest discretion in local
officials and trust them to preserve white supremacy. Disfranchisement was essential
to this strategy . . . facilitat[ing] the exclusion of blacks from juries and diversion of
their share of public school funds.”).
61. Enforcement Act of 1870, 41st Cong. 114, 116 Stat. 140.
62. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 127 (1903).
63. Id. at 139.
64. Id. at 127.
65. Id. at 139.
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voter suppression and transferred the policing of private voter sup-
pression to states that fundamentally lacked both the capacity and in-
clination to protect voting rights. This transfer of power to the states
free from federal supervision prevented the passage of state civil
rights statutes and establishment of state governments reflecting the
will of all residents—including African Americans. In sum, African
Americans were left without any meaningful federal or state voter
protection laws, and the fundamental purpose of the Fifteenth
Amendment was effectively nullified throughout the South.
In 1935, three decades after deciding James v. Bowman, the Court
again applied the state action doctrine in a manner that substantially
undermined black suffrage. In Grovey v. Townsend, the Court held
that the Texas Democratic Party’s exclusion of African Americans
from primary elections was insulated from constitutional challenge by
the state action doctrine.66 Grovey followed a series of cases in which
the Texas legislature repeatedly invoked the state action doctrine as a
shield against black suffrage.
In Nixon v. Herndon, the Court struck down the statutory exclusion
of African Americans from participating in Democratic primaries.67
Texas invoked the state action doctrine and shifted the authority to
prohibit African Americans from voting in primaries to the Demo-
cratic Party’s State Executive Committee. In Nixon v. Condon, the
Court invalidated Texas’ response to Herndon.68 The Texas Legisla-
ture responded by further “privatizing” political parties. The Legisla-
ture authorized the Democratic Party to establish primary
participation guidelines, again attempting to use the state action doc-
trine as a shield to insulate voting discrimination from the strictures of
the Constitution.69 This time, Texas succeeded. In Grovey, the Court
determined that state action was no longer present, and that the vot-
ing discrimination scheme did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.70
This formalistic, inegalitarian, and avoidable71 application of the state
action doctrine effectively disfranchised black southerners, as the
power of the Democratic Party in the South rendered Democratic
primaries the only meaningful voting opportunity. It was not until the
mid-twentieth century that the Court was finally willing to reform the
66. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935).
67. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
68. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82–89 (1932).
69. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659 (1944).
70. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935).
71. See, e.g., KLARMAN supra note 58, at 140 (“[T]he justices might easily have
found state action in Grovey without ruling that inaction was tantamount to ac-
tion. . . . Given changing general attitudes toward government responsibility for
nonregulation and the numerous ways in which Texas did regulate political parties,
the justices’ determination that Texas Democrats’ exclusion of blacks was not state
action must indicate a relative indifference toward race discrimination in the political
process.”).
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state action doctrine and prevent the flagrant nullification of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.72
3. Decreased Access to Housing and Increased
Residential Segregation
Third, the Court’s formalistic application of the state action doc-
trine contributed to the maintenance of residential segregation and
the limitation of African Americans’ access to housing. Specifically,
the state action doctrine, as formalistically applied by the Court, insu-
lated the enforcement of racially restrictive housing covenants from
constitutional scrutiny until the mid-twentieth century.
Residential segregation followed the migration of African Ameri-
cans’ from the South to the North and from rural to urban areas.73
Applied in a patently separate and unequal manner, residential segre-
gation relegated African American migrants to the slums of society.74
State and local laws initially established and maintained residential
segregation.75 These laws obviously involved state action, and the Su-
preme Court invalidated the laws in Buchanan v. Warley.76 After the
invalidation of de jure residential segregation, enforcement of private
racially restrictive covenants maintained the discriminatory system.77
The Supreme Court faced a challenge to the constitutionality of pri-
vate racially restrictive covenants in 1926 in Corrigan v. Buckley.78 In
Corrigan, John Buckley, a white landowner, sued to prevent Irene
Corrigan, another white landowner, who had previously signed a ra-
cially restrictive covenant agreeing not to sell property to African
Americans, from selling land to Arthur and Helen Curtis, an African
American couple. Ms. Corrigan and Mr. and Mrs. Curtis argued that
the racially restrictive covenant violated the Equal Protection
Clause.79 The Court applied the state action doctrine to avoid ruling
on the constitutionality of private racially restrictive covenants, hold-
ing that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit “private individ-
uals from entering into contracts respecting the control and
disposition of their own property; and there is no color whatever for
72. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). The Authors discuss this case in
more detail later in this essay.
73. KLARMAN, supra note 58 (“As rural blacks flocked to cities in search of better
economic opportunities, education, and physical security, whites began insisting on
residential segregation.”).
74. Id. (“Black migrants were shunted into low-lying areas on city peripheries,
often near railroad tracks or dumps.”).
75. Id. (“Baltimore enacted the first such ordinance in 1910, and similar laws pro-
liferated over the decade.”).
76. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76 (1917).
77. See KLARMAN, supra note 58, at 144 (“Racial covenants were the private alter-
native to residential segregation ordinances, and it could be argued that they were
immune from constitutional attack because state action was absent.”).
78. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).
79. Id. at 328–29.
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the contention that [the Equal Protection Clause] rendered the [re-
strictive covenant] void.”80 The Court further indicated, in dicta, that
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants would not consti-
tute state action.81 In so noting, the Court indirectly maintained resi-
dential segregation and limited African Americans’ access to housing
for another two decades. It was not until the mid-twentieth century
that the Court finally applied a more functional and egalitarian formu-
lation of the state action doctrine and prevented courts from enforcing
private residential segregation through racially restrictive covenants.82
C. New and Expanding Conceptions of When the State is Acting
(1940s–Present)
Following a prolonged period spanning the invention of the state
action doctrine until the 1940s—throughout which the Supreme Court
consistently applied a formalistic and inegalitarian formulation of the
state action doctrine—the Court introduced a period of relative (al-
though concededly inconsistent) relaxation of the state action doc-
trine. In this Section, the Authors summarize several lines of cases
illustrating the Court’s progressive reformulation of the state action
doctrine. A number of these cases directly overrule prior cases in
which the Court applied an inegalitarian formulation of the state ac-
tion doctrine. The Authors focus primarily on “public function cases”
and “entanglement” cases. Since 1940, the Court often—although by
no means always—found state action in these two broad categories of
cases. That functional approach was followed by a revived formalistic
approach as a more conservative Supreme Court in the 1970s sought
to restore a narrow conception of state action focused on tradition
rather than substance.
1. Public Function Cases
Public function cases involve private entities performing a function
that the government traditionally performed.83 The principal public
function cases involve voting, managing a town, and managing public
parks. In these cases, all of which occurred after 1940, the Supreme
Court endorsed a functional conception of the state action doctrine.
This approach was less inclined to avoid the merits of important civil
rights cases and more attuned to racial and social justice, social reality,
80. Id. at 330.
81. Id. at 330–32; see also KLARMAN supra note 58, at 144 (“Corrigan’s dicta had
plainly sustained judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants, and many state courts
so interpreted it.”).
82. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). This is a remarkable case, which
the Authors discuss in detail later in this Article.
83. See Martha Minow, Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine in the Era of
Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: Directing Law to Service
Human Needs, 52 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 145, 152–54 (2017).
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power, and relations of domination and oppression. After 1970, the
Court revived more formalistic reasoning to narrow the scope of these
public function cases.
The post-1940 voting rights cases diverge markedly from the previ-
ously discussed line of cases culminating in Grovey v. Townsend. In
1944, just a decade after deciding Grovey, the Court reversed course
and finally began to loosen the state action doctrine’s chokehold on
the Fifteenth Amendment. In Smith v. Allwright, the Court faced es-
sentially the same facts as Grovey.84 The state invoked the state action
doctrine shield by delegating voter regulation authority to “private”
political parties.85 But, this time the Court applied a functional formu-
lation of the state action doctrine. The Court reached the opposite
conclusion from Grovey and held that the inherent overlap between
state governments and political parties and the status of voter regula-
tion as a fundamentally public function was sufficient to constitute
state action.86
The Court reaffirmed Smith’s functional formulation of the state ac-
tion doctrine to protect the voting rights of African Americans in sub-
sequent “white primaries” cases. In the most notable of these
subsequent cases, Terry v. Adams, the Court extended Smith’s reason-
ing to invalidate white-only pre-primary elections (conducted by a pri-
vate club called the Jaybird Democratic Association) as an
unconstitutional state action that violated the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.87 In so holding, the Terry Court demonstrated a remarkable
willingness to elevate racial justice over formal adherence to an ine-
galitarian conception of the state action doctrine.
In 1946, the Court decided Marsh v. Alabama, another key case.88
Marsh involved Chickasaw, a company-owned town in Alabama that
had “all the characteristics of any other American town . . . [including]
residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal
plant and a ‘business block’ on which business places are situated.”89
A company rule prohibited the dissemination of leaflets throughout
84. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659 (1944).
85. Id. at 654–56.
86. Id. at 664.
87. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (“The Democratic primary and
the general election have become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice
that has already been made in Jaybird elections from which Negroes have been ex-
cluded. It is immaterial that the state does not control that part of this elective process
which it leaves for the Jaybirds to manage. The Jaybird primary has become an inte-
gral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process that determines who
shall rule and govern in the county. The effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird pri-
mary plus Democratic primary plus general election, is to do precisely that which the
Fifteenth Amendment forbids—strip Negroes of every vestige of influence in select-
ing the officials who control the local county matters that intimately touch the daily
lives of citizens.”).
88. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
89. Id. at 502.
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the limits of the town, and the state police enforced this rule through
the law of criminal trespass.90 An appellant convicted of criminal tres-
pass challenged the constitutionality of the state’s enforcement of the
company rule. The Court applied a functional formulation of the state
action doctrine and concluded that state action was present despite
the “private” status of the company town.91 Despite the company’s
private property rights, the Court held that the governmental enforce-
ment of the company rule violated the Constitution.92
In so holding, the Court applied a balancing test, which weighed the
property rights of the company against the constitutional rights of the
appellant.93 Crucially, the Court emphasized that “[o]wnership does
not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his ad-
vantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it.”94 This test meant that not all prop-
erty rights are the same. The property’s uses and the social context in
which property rights are exercised—as well as the effects those rights
have on others with similar or different legal rights—all matter in de-
termining whether an owner is exercising powers that should be sub-
ject to constitutional equality norms.
In sum, the functional approach to the question of state action al-
lowed the Court to focus on the more difficult and important issue of
balancing competing constitutional rights and protecting a private
sphere of liberty while ensuring equal access to the public market-
place. Significantly, the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause
required a normative choice between competing property rights: the
right to exclude and the right of access. Just as public accommodation
common law always granted the public rights to enter private property
that was generally open to the public for the provision of goods or
services, the Court found that the Constitution privileged rights of ac-
cess for free speech purposes over the right to exclude when a private
owner controls property that is and should be open to the public.95
90. Id. at 503–04.
91. Id. at 507–09.
92. Id. at 508 (“The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the
liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the
Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which en-
forces such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious
literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.”).
93. Id. at 509.
94. Id. at 506.
95. See also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (hold-
ing that the California Constitution’s requirement that privately owned shopping cen-
ters allow access to non-owners for leafletting purposes did not constitute a taking of
the shopping center owner’s property without just compensation, despite limitation of
its right to exclude, given that the speech activities did not “impair the value or use”
of the property).
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In 1966, the Court decided Evans v. Newton, another landmark
public function case.96 In Newton, Augustus Bacon, a United States
Senator, bequeathed a tract of property in a charitable trust to the
City of Macon, Georgia “to be used as ‘a park and pleasure ground’
for white people only.”97 The city was named trustee and, in accor-
dance with the will, the city named a board of managers who operated
and maintained the park in a segregated fashion.98 After some years,
the city acknowledged that the park was a public facility “which it
could not constitutionally manage and maintain on a segregated ba-
sis.”99 The board of managers sued the city and asked that title be
transferred from the city to new private trustees so that the park could
continue to exclude African Americans.100 Georgia citizens inter-
vened to challenge the segregation of the park, arguing that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause.101 The city resigned as trustee, and the
Georgia state courts accepted the resignation and appointed new pri-
vate trustees who would manage the park as Senator Bacon wanted—
for the benefit of white people only.102
The Supreme Court held that the state court’s transfer of title from
the city to private trustees did not turn state action into private ac-
tion.103 The Court applied a functional formulation of the state action
doctrine, and held that state action was present despite the fact that
the property was bequeathed by a private individual and managed by
private entities.104 In so holding, the Court acknowledged that “[w]hat
is ‘private’ action and what is ‘state’ action is not always easy to deter-
mine,”105 and it emphasized that “[c]onduct that is formally ‘private’
may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impreg-
nated with a governmental character as to become subject to the con-
stitutional limitations placed upon state action.”106
The Court explained that “[i]f a testator wanted to leave a school or
center for the use of one race only and in no way implicated the State
in the supervision, control, or management of the facility, we assume
arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered.”107
But that did not happen here. The original transfer of title was to the
96. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966).
97. Id. at 297.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 297–98.
101. Id. at 298.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 302.
104. Id. (“[T]he public character of this park requires that it be treated as a public
institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who
now has title under state law.”).
105. Id. at 299.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 300 (emphasis omitted).
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city as trustee, and the park was managed by the city for years.108
Even after the transfer from the city to private trustees, the city still
paid for maintenance of the park.109
Moreover, the Court concluded that parks “serve a public function”
when they are open to the general public, making them  “more like a
fire department or police department that traditionally serves the
community[,]”110 than a private social club that is selective in na-
ture.111 The Court reasoned that “the use of parks is plainly in the
public domain[,]”112 and “when private individuals or groups are en-
dowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature,
they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to
its constitutional limitations.”113 Thus, the transfer of formal title to
private trustees could not change the underlying facts that title was
originally in the hands of the city and the property was operated as a
public park open to all white persons. After finding state action, the
Court concluded that segregating the park—consistent with the wishes
of Senator Bacon—would violate the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Court remanded for state courts to consider the appropriate treat-
ment of the bequest.114
Following the Court’s decision in Newton, the state courts deter-
mined that the Senator would have preferred the entire bequest to fail
rather than allowing African Americans equal access to the park.115
Applying Georgia common law, the Georgia Supreme Court refused
to apply the cy pres doctrine and allow the trust to continue under
new conditions.116 Because the trust was premised on a very specific
use (as a racially segregated park) and that purpose could no longer
be fulfilled, the trust failed and title to the land reverted to Senator
Bacon’s heirs.
The Georgia Supreme Court faced a contradiction in Senator Ba-
con’s will. He wanted the park to be owned by the city and open to
the public, but he also wanted it to be closed to African Americans.
Those two wishes could not be fulfilled because doing so would vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. State trust law provides that if a
donor’s wish can no longer be fulfilled, the courts must determine if
his grant was specific or general. For example, if someone wants to
108. Id. at 297.
109. Id. at 301 (“So far as this record shows, there has been no change in municipal
maintenance and concern over this facility [since the transfer to private trustees].”).
110. Id. (“This conclusion is buttressed by the nature of the service rendered the
community by a park. The service rendered even by a private park of this character is
municipal in nature. It is open to every white person, there being no selective element
other than race.”).
111. Id. at 302.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 299.
114. Id. at 302.
115. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 436 (1970).
116. Id. at 439.
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benefit the Boston Symphony Orchestra (“BSO”) alone and the BSO
folds, the trust will fail and the property will revert to the donor’s
heirs. But, if the donor wanted to benefit the classical music scene in
Boston, the courts could reform the trust and transfer the income to
another entity, such as the Handel and Haydn Society.
That means the Georgia Supreme Court faced two questions. First,
was Senator Bacon’s desire to create a public park more important to
him than his desire to refuse to participate in creating an integrated
facility? His intent to exclude African Americans was clear, but so was
his desire to create a public park. Second, should the Court assume
that Senator Bacon would want the courts to ask what he wanted at
the time of his death or what he would have wanted the courts to do at
the time they made the decision whether to open the park on an inte-
grated basis? Consider that many persons changed their views over
time. George Wallace, for example, was a firm champion of segrega-
tion but eventually changed his mind and was elected Governor of
Alabama with the support—and votes—of many African Americans.
Ultimately, the Georgia Supreme Court decided that the Senator’s ra-
cist views would have been more important to him than his charitable
inclinations. The Court decided as a matter of state property law the
trust should fail, that the property revert to Senator Bacon’s heirs, and
that the park be closed.
Upon reviewing the case a second time, in Evans v. Abney, the
United States Supreme Court held that closing the park to fulfill Sena-
tor Bacon’s discriminatory intent did not constitute state action deny-
ing equal protection of the law.117 The Court reasoned that, after the
park was closed, there could be no denial of equality, because neither
black nor white persons would have access to the park.118 Nor did it
matter, the Court reasoned, that the motivation for the reversion was
discriminatory because the motivation was that of the private donor
rather than the city.119
Justice Brennan dissented.120 He argued that there was ample evi-
dence that Georgia acted to deny African Americans equal protection
of the law. Justice Brennan noted that the clear and uncontested rea-
son for closing the park was Senator Bacon’s discriminatory intent.121
He emphasized that “state involvement in discrimination is unconsti-
tutional, however short-lived.”122 He highlighted the many ways in
which the “discriminatory closing [was] permeated with state ac-
tion.”123 Specifically, he outlined three elements of state action pre-
117. Id. at 444.
118. Id. at 445.
119. Id. at 447.
120. Id. at 450.
121. Id. at 452–53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 454.
123. Id.
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sent in the closing of the park. Tellingly, he focused on the ways that
state law (both common law and statutory law) constructed property
rights.
First, Justice Brennan argued that “there is state action whenever a
State enters into an arrangement that creates a private right to compel
or enforce the reversion of a public facility. Whether the right is a
possibility of reverter, a right of entry, an executory interest, or a con-
tractual right, it can be created only with the consent of a public body
or official.”124 Georgia, acting through the city of Macon, accepted
transfer of title from Senator Bacon to the city together with the racial
restriction and, according to state law, the possibility that the retained
future interest in the donor’s heirs would activate if it became impossi-
ble to operate the park as Senator Bacon would have wished. State
action was present because (1) the city accepted title to the property
(it could have refused the gift); and (2) state action in the form of a
lawsuit and judicial order would be necessary to transfer clear title
from the city to private trustees even if state law provided that title
would automatically shift upon violation of the racial condition.
Further, Georgia abdicated its responsibility to manage the public
park in a constitutional (nondiscriminatory) fashion in order to effec-
tuate discriminatory private interests. In effect, the state transferred
control of the park to persons it knew would engage in the discrimina-
tory actions that the state had no power to do itself. It was as if a
landlord disclaimed responsibility for discriminatory refusal to rent
apartments to African American customers by hiring an apartment
manager who exercised their discretion to engage in such discrimina-
tory denials of housing opportunities. Such delegation of discretion to
a manager cannot insulate the landlord from responsibility under the
Fair Housing Act, for example, because the landlord’s failure to inter-
vene to stop the discriminatory denial of access to property counts as
a ratification of the discrimination and makes the landlord directly
responsible for the discriminatory acts.125 Thus, in the same way, the
state should not be able to delegate its discretion to another, knowing
that the other would engage in discriminatory actions that the state
itself is prohibited from engaging in.
124. Id. at 455.
125. See Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1989) (landlord held to have
ratified his manager’s discriminatory denial of housing by refusing to intervene to
correct the discrimination). Accord, MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 319 F.3d
581 (2d Cir. 2016) (city liable for discriminatory treatment when village governing
council changes a zoning designation in response to discriminatory demands of city
residents). The fact that Georgia was implementing private discriminatory purposes
distinguishes the case from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
where the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause requires intentional
discrimination on the part of the government. Rather than a neutral policy that has a
disparate impact, deferring to private discrimination directly achieves the discrimina-
tory purpose. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
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Second, Justice Brennan argued that Shelley v. Kraemer “stands at
least for the proposition that where parties of different races are will-
ing to deal with one another a state court cannot keep them from
doing so by enforcing a privately devised racial restriction.”126 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the record did not demonstrate that the
city, white beneficiaries, or African American citizens were unwilling
to continue using the park on an integrated basis. Therefore, Justice
Brennan concluded that “so far as the record shows, this is a case of a
state court’s enforcement of a racial restriction to prevent willing par-
ties from dealing with one another. The decision of the Georgia courts
thus, under Shelley v. Kraemer, constitutes state action denying equal
protection.”127
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that Reitman v. Mulkey “announced
the basic principle that a State acts in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause when it singles out racial discrimination for particular en-
couragement, and thereby gives it a special preferred status in the law,
even though the State does not itself impose or compel segrega-
tion.”128 According to Justice Brennan, Georgia violated this principle
by enacting a statute that authorized creation of charitable trusts for
one race only.129 In so doing, Georgia
expressly permit[ted] dedication of land to the public for use as a
park open to one race only. Thereby Georgia undertook to facilitate
racial restrictions as distinguished from all other kinds of restriction
on access to a public park. Reitman compels the conclusion that in
doing so Georgia violated the Equal Protection Clause.”130
Drawing from these three elements of state action, Justice Brennan
concluded that “[t]his, then, is not a case of private discrimination. It
is rather discrimination in which the State of Georgia is ‘significantly
involved,’ and enforcement of the reverter is therefore
unconstitutional.131
Justice Brennan’s dissent focused on explaining why state action
was present in Evan v. Abney. The majority opinion focused on ex-
plaining why no denial of equality was present even if state action was
present. Justice Brennan’s opinion could have responded to
paragraphs in the majority opinion that were deleted from the pub-
lished opinion where the majority found that state action was present.
If that is what happened, then it would seem that the majority was not
confident in believing that no state action was present in the case and
preferred to treat that question as unnecessary to the result. In any
event, the failure of the majority to vigorously defend the idea that
126. Evans, 396 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 457–458.
130. Id. at 458 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)).
131. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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there was no state action present suggests that the Court was reluctant
to allow private owners of property to engage in discrimination when
their property is functionally “public” in nature.
These public function cases illustrate the Court’s post-1940 func-
tional reformulation of the state action doctrine. Under this more
egalitarian formulation, the Court found state action in situations
nearly identical to pre-1940 cases in which it failed to find state ac-
tion.132 This trend demonstrates the flexibility of the state action doc-
trine and the capacity of the Court to bend the doctrine to reach the
merits of important cases when it chooses.
Later, as new Justices joined the Supreme Court and political winds
changed, a more conservative Supreme Court sought to narrow the
public function doctrine to encompass only those activities “that have
been traditionally and exclusively the responsibility of the state.”133
Thus, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,134 Justice Rehnquist
wrote an opinion for the Court that refused to treat a public utility
company that was the sole provider of electricity to an area in Penn-
sylvania as a state actor in a case involving wrongful discharge because
“the supplying of utility service is not traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the State.”135 Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dis-
sented. They worried that “the majority’s analysis would seemingly
apply . . . to a company that refused to extend service to Negroes,
welfare recipients, or any other group that the company preferred.”136
The dissent suggested that what is relevant is not whether the com-
pany was or was not a “state actor,” but the relative pertinence, rele-
vance, and strength of interests in economic choice and private
freedom versus equal protection under law,137 a normative choice ren-
dered invisible by diverting attention to the task of defining what is
and is not “state action” or whether a function has been “tradition-
ally” or “exclusively” performed by a state actor.
2. Entanglement Cases
Entanglement cases involve situations in which government autho-
rizes, encourages, facilitates, or becomes significantly involved with
132. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v. Town-
send, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
133. Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action
Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. REV. 575, 588 (emphasis added) (citing Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)) (emphasis added).
134. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
135. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 374 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. See Schmidt, supra note 133, at 598 (“The complexity of the state action doc-
trine is thus the product of the particular task the courts have chosen to assign the
doctrine: limiting the boundaries between state responsibility and private initiative.”).
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private discrimination.138 In several important post-1940 cases, the
Court held that there was sufficient entanglement between govern-
mental and private conduct to constitute state action. These cases, in
addition to the previously discussed public function cases, illustrate a
more egalitarian and less formalistic application of the state action
doctrine.
The most famous entanglement case, and perhaps the most famous
state action case, is Shelley v. Kraemer.139 In Shelley, the Court held
that judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants con-
stituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Shel-
ley was an appeal of two cases, one from the state of Missouri and the
other from the state of Michigan.140
In the Missouri case, the majority of residents in a neighborhood in
St. Louis signed a private racially restrictive covenant prohibiting the
sale of property to non-white individuals.141 Several landowners sold
parcels of land to African American individuals and families who then
moved into their new homes.142 After that, several neighbors sued to
enforce the racially restrictive covenants, demanding that the new Af-
rican American residents be removed from their new homes.143 The
Missouri Supreme Court upheld the racially restrictive covenant, rul-
ing against the Shelley family and the other African American re-
sidents.144 In so doing, it interpreted and applied several doctrines of
state property law.145
First, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the drafter’s intent to
be that the covenants would be enforceable despite the fact that a
quarter of owners in the neighborhood did not agree to sign.146 In so
doing, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s factual
finding that the drafters intended to restrict the whole neighbor-
hood—an intent that could not be fulfilled if all the owners did not
sign.147
Second, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the covenant did not
violate state public policy even though it imposed a partial restraint on
alienation of fee simple interests—a restraint that could easily have
been determined to violate the common law rule against unreasonable
138. See generally Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 455–56, 459 (1970) (noting that
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion states that he would have analyzed the case as
involving both a public function and entanglement with government). Note that Jus-
tice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Evans v. Abney would have analyzed that case as
involving both a public function and entanglement with government.
139. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
140. Id. at 4, 6.
141. Id. at 4–5.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id.
145. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 681–83 (Mo. 1946).
146. Id. at 681–82.
147. Id. at 683.
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restraints on alienation.148 In previous cases, the court had struck
down restraints on alienation of fee simple interests as violations of
public policy.149
Third, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the documents could
be accepted by the official recorder of deeds, effectively placing subse-
quent buyers on constructive notice of the restrictions, and ensuring
that the restrictions would run with the land as equitable servitudes
binding future owners of the property.150 That meant that it was con-
sistent with state property law to create restricted fee interests that
would bind future owners who did not personally agree to the restric-
tions. The Michigan Supreme Court made similar findings in Sipes v.
McGhee.151
The petitioners appealed the decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and argued that the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive cove-
nants constituted discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.152 The respondents countered that the racially re-
strictive covenant was merely a private contractual agreement beyond
the strictures of the Constitution, and that judicial enforcement of the
agreement did not constitute state action.153 The Court sided with the
petitioners, holding that the judicial enforcement of the covenants was
state action and that the state action violated the Equal Protection
Clause.154
Specifically, the Court concluded that the “action of state courts
and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as
action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”155 In so holding, the Court emphasized language from several
early state action cases indicating that state action includes “state au-
thority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceed-
ings.”156 The Court forcefully concluded with the following statement:
It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts,
supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint. . . .
We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive
agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the
148. Id. at 682–83.
149. Triplett v. Triplett, 60 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Mo. 1933); Clark v. Ferguson, 144 S.W. 2d
116, 118 (Mo. 1940).
150. Kraemer, 198 S.W.2d at 683.
151. Sipes et. al v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638, 640–41, 645 (Mich. 1947), rev’d sub.
nom, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that a racially restrictive cove-
nant was enforceable when signed by owners of more than 80% of the property cov-
ered by the restraint and it did not violate public policy).
152. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8–9, 18.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id. at 14.
155. Id. at 14.
156. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the
state courts cannot stand.157
It is important to note that, at the time the Supreme Court decided
Shelley v. Kraemer, the Shelley family was living in the house.158 If the
Court found no state action, and the Shelley family refused to leave,
the sheriff would have enforced the covenant by physically removing
the family and their possessions from the property. The state courts
would have divested the Shelley family of title to the land and chosen
to whom to transfer that title. It is evident that describing this scenario
as devoid of “state action” is, at best, obfuscatory, and at worst, dis-
honest. There may be an issue of whether the covenanting neighbors’
property rights or the Shelley’s property rights should prevail, and
there may also be an issue of whether enforcement of the covenant
denies equal access to the housing market. It is hard to see why it is
sensible to characterize the state as uninvolved in the definition, allo-
cation, and enforcement of property rights. This is especially true
when we recall the normative decisions that the state supreme courts
had to make to come to the conclusion that the restriction did not
constitute an invalid restraint on alienation repugnant to the fee sim-
ple estate owned by the Shelley family.
Another important entanglement case is New York Times v. Sulli-
van.159 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that the application of
common law is state action that must comply with the strictures of the
Constitution.160 In Sullivan, a City Commissioner for Montgomery,
Alabama, sued the New York Times for common law libel.161 The
New York Times countered that enforcement of the common law libel
rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion.162 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a damage award for
$500,000, and dismissed the New York Times’ constitutional claim on
the grounds that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is directed against
State action and not private action.”163 The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the state’s enforcement of its common law libel
rule constituted state action that violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.164
Specifically, the Court concluded that:
157. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19–20.
158. Id. at 6 (“At the time the [Missouri Supreme Court] rendered its decision, [the
Shelley family was] occupying the property in question.”).
159. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Matal v. Tam, 2017
WL 2621315 (U.S. June 19, 2017) (First Amendment applies to federal Lanham Act
regulating trademarks).
160. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283–84.
161. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
162. Id. at 265.
163. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So.2d 25, 28, 40 (Ala. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
164. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
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[a]lthough this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Ala-
bama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim
to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
statute. . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised.165
After Sullivan, it is clear that the governmental application of com-
mon law—to the same degree as statutory law—is subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny.
A third influential entanglement case is Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co.166
In Adickes, the Court held that—like common law or statutory law—
state-enforced custom constitutes state action.167 Sandra Adickes, a
white schoolteacher, was arrested and convicted of vagrancy after she
entered a restaurant in Mississippi with several African American stu-
dents.168 Ms. Adickes appealed her conviction to the U.S. Supreme
Court, arguing that her arrest and conviction violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.169 The Court held that a state-enforced custom of seg-
regation, fostered by the conduct of state officials (i.e., police), could
constitute state action to the same degree as a statute mandating
segregation.170
The Court noted that “[t]he involvement of a state official in such a
conspiracy [to exclude Ms. Adickes from the restaurant based solely
on the race of her students] plainly provides the state action essential
to show a direct violation of petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights, whether or not the actions of the police were
officially authorized, or lawful.”171 The Court went on to note that
“settled practices of state officials may, by imposing sanctions or with-
holding benefits, transform private predilections into compulsory
rules of behavior no less than legislative pronouncements.”172 Relying
on this reasoning, the Court held that “[f]or state action purposes it
makes no difference of course whether the racially discriminatory act
by the private party is compelled by a statutory provision or by a cus-
tom having the force of law—in either case it is the State that has
commanded the result by its law.”173
165. Id. at 265.
166. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
167. Id. at 170–71.
168. Id. at 200.
169. Id. at 144.
170. Id. at 170–71.
171. Id. at 151.
172. Id. at 168.
173. Id. at 171.
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A fourth key entanglement case is Reitman v. Mulkey,174 which held
that a state constitutional amendment that repealed the state fair
housing statute allowing property owners to discriminate in real estate
practices constituted discriminatory state action in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. In Reitman, California citizens adopted an
amendment to the California Constitution in response to the enact-
ment of a state statute that prohibited private landowners from dis-
criminating in the sale and rental of housing.175 The California
Supreme Court determined that the “immediate design and intent”176
of the constitutional amendment was “to overturn state laws that bore
on the right of private sellers and lessors to discriminate . . . [and] to
forestall future state action that might circumscribe this right.”177
After the California Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history
and context of the amendment, the Court held that “the State
[through the amendment] had taken affirmative action designed to
make private discriminations legally possible” and had thus violated
the Equal Protection Clause.178 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed,
and held that:
Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial dis-
crimination in the housing market. The right to discriminate is now
one of the basic policies of the State. The California Supreme Court
believes that the section will significantly encourage and involve the
State in private discriminations. We have been presented with no
persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be
overturned.179
This case is a powerful egalitarian reformation of the state action
doctrine, as it establishes the principle that deregulation—even when
implemented through popular referendum—may still constitute state
action denying the equal protection of the law.180
As a matter of property law, in Reitman the California constitu-
tional amendment transferred a property right from one set of owners
to another set of owners. After passage of the state’s fair housing law,
land owners no longer had the power to refuse to sell or rent to pro-
spective buyers or renters based on race;181 that right belonged to the
general public which had the power to go to court for a remedy if a
housing provider refused to sell or lease on the ground of the buyer’s
race. The constitutional amendment stripped the public of their right
174. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967).
175. Id. at 371.
176. Id. at 374.
177. Id. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that state consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting any legislative, executive, or judicial action to protect
LGBTQ persons from discrimination violated the Equal Protection clause).
178. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375.
179. Id. at 381.
180. Id. at 380–81.
181. Id. at 374.
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to purchase or lease property without regard to race and granted
property owners the power to engage in discriminatory practices.182
While the fair housing law promoted equality, the constitutional
amendment denied it.183
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court found state action when the gov-
ernment enforced a restrictive covenant.184 In Reitman v. Mulkey, the
Court found state action when the government allowed owners the
freedom to refuse to sell on the basis of the race.185 State action was
present whether the law imposed a duty on an owner that was en-
forceable by neighboring right holders (Shelley) or the law gave own-
ers the privilege to refuse to deal with buyers because of their race
(Reitman).186 Moreover, the Shelley Court not only found state action
but a deprivation of equal protection of law.187 This occurred despite
the fact that the Missouri and Michigan courts would have enforced a
racial covenant prohibiting sale to white persons and despite the fact
that the California constitutional amendment did not require any ac-
tion, and only allowed discriminatory refusals to sell.188 In both Shel-
ley and Reitman, the Court found a denial of equal protection because
the laws (whether coercive or permissive) promoted white supremacy
by making it difficult or impossible for African Americans to enter the
real estate market to acquire property on an equal and nondiscrimina-
tory basis.189
Three more important entanglement cases that specifically involve
access to places of public accommodation are Robinson v. Florida,190
Lombard v. Louisiana,191 and Bell v. Maryland.192 In Robinson, a ra-
cially-segregated restaurant denied a group of African Americans ser-
vice.193 The restaurant manager called the police after the group
refused to leave, and the group was arrested and convicted of tres-
pass.194 The defendants challenged their conviction as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.195 The government contended that state
action was not present because a private business carried out the dis-
criminatory conduct, not the state.196
182. Id. at 380–81.
183. Id. at 374.
184. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
185. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 380–81.
186. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 380–81.
187. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
188. Id. at 19–20.
189. Id.
190. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
191. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
192. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). See Mack, supra note 14 (analyzing
whether Robert Mack Bell was violating any law when he “sat in” at Hooper’s restau-
rant in downtown Baltimore).
193. Robinson, 378 U.S. at 153–54.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 154.
196. Id.
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The Supreme Court found state action under a theory of govern-
ment entanglement.197 Specifically, the Court highlighted a govern-
ment regulation requiring restaurants to maintain racially segregated
restrooms.198 The Court reasoned that “[w]hile these Florida regula-
tions do not directly and expressly forbid restaurants to serve both
white and colored people together, they certainly embody a state pol-
icy putting burdens upon any restaurant which serves both races, bur-
dens bound to discourage the serving of the two races together.”199
The Court concluded that this government entanglement—although
indirect—constituted discriminatory state action in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.200 Despite the Court’s willingness to apply
an egalitarian formulation of the state action doctrine, it refused to
reach the question of whether the arrest, prosecution, and conviction
of defendants—independent of the restroom segregation—constituted
discriminatory state action.201
The Lombard Court faced facts similar to Robinson and extended
its holding to find state action on a theory of government entangle-
ment.202 In Lombard, African American patrons were denied service
at an all-white restaurant.203 The restaurant manager summoned the
police after the group refused to leave.204 After several police officers
consulted with the restaurant manager, the police officers, including a
captain and major, arrested the patrons. The patrons were later con-
victed of trespass.205 Unlike the Robinson Court, the Lombard Court
located no government ordinance condoning or encouraging segrega-
tion.206 Yet, the Court still found state action in public statements
made by the New Orleans mayor and superintendent of police con-
demning sit-ins and denouncing racially integrated service at lunch
counters.207 The Court reasoned that the public statements “direct[ed]
continuance of segregated service in restaurants,”208 and concluded
that “the city must be treated exactly as if it had an ordinance prohib-
iting such conduct.”209 The Court held that the state action violated
the Equal Protection Clause.210 Even though there was no specific law
197. Id. at 156–57.
198. Id. at 156.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 157.
201. Id. at 155. (“In this case we do not reach the broad question whether the Four-
teenth Amendment of its own force forbids a State to arrest and prosecute those who,
having been asked to leave a restaurant because of their color, refuse to do so.”).
202. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 267 (1963).
203. Id. at 268.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 269.
206. See id. at 267.
207. Id. at 273.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 273, 276.
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that required segregation, public officials encouraged private discrimi-
natory practices, and thus participated in establishing segregated pub-
lic accommodations.
Bell involved facts quite similar to Robinson and Lombard.211 A
segregated restaurant denied service to African American patrons.
The patrons were arrested and convicted of trespass after they refused
to leave.212 The only substantial difference was that Bell did not in-
volve discriminatory laws, like Robinson, or explicitly discriminatory
executive action, like Lombard.213 In Bell, the Court faced a question
that it has yet to answer: does the governmental enforcement (e.g.,
through police and prosecutors) of trespass laws constitute state ac-
tion denying access to public accommodations, despite an absence of
discriminatory laws or executive statements encouraging or requiring
racial exclusion from places of public accommodation?214 The Court
avoided answering this question and reasoned that “the supervening
enactment of the city and state public accommodations laws” com-
pelled reconsideration of the convictions by the lower court.215
However, Justices Douglas and Goldberg wrote a concurrence that
reached the state action question. The concurrence argued that gov-
ernmental enforcement—through police, prosecutors, and courts—of
trespass laws constitutes state action, at least when the party pursuing
discriminatory exclusion is a place of public accommodation.216 In
reaching this conclusion, Justices Douglas and Goldberg emphasized
the quasi-public nature of privately owned restaurants and other
places of public accommodation, as well as the involvement of several
layers of government in enforcing discriminatory exclusion through
trespass laws.217 As in Shelley and Reitman, Justices Douglas and
Goldberg would have found that enforced racial segregation in public
accommodations denies equal protection of the law even if public offi-
cials merely deferred to private discriminatory motives.218 The concur-
rence is discussed in detail in Part III of this Article.
The final, most recent entanglement case is Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association.219 In Brentwood
Academy, the Supreme Court arguably broadened the entanglement
standard to a more permissive “entwinement” standard. This standard
211. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227–28 (1964).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 228; see also Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 153–54 & n.1 (1964);
see also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273 (1963).
214. Bell, 378 U.S. at 228.
215. Id. at 239. Cf. Mack, supra note 14, at 363–64 (arguing that it was unclear what
state law actually was at the time of Bell’s arrest, suggesting that state action was
needed to answer that question one way or the other).
216. Bell, 378 U.S. at 260 (Douglas, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 252, 257, 259–60.
218. Id. at 259–60.
219. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001).
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requires government involvement but does not require any level of
government encouragement for state action to be present.220 The
Court found a private association charged with regulating high school
athletics to be a state actor because of its “entwinement” with govern-
mental activities.221 As Professor Chemerinsky noted:
Entanglement. . . had been found to require government encourage-
ment of constitutional violations by private actors. But no encour-
agement was found in Brentwood Academy. Instead, the Court
found that significant government involvement with the private en-
tity was sufficient for a finding of state action. This seems to be a
much more expansive exception to the state action doctrine than [ ]
found in prior cases.222
In these entanglement cases—to an even greater degree than the
public function cases—the Court applied a functional conception of
the state action doctrine. The Court found state action in situations
nearly identical to pre-1940 cases where no state action had been
found.223 This trend highlights the Court’s evolving understanding of
the significant overlap between the public and private spheres, as well
as its (occasional) willingness in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries to apply a more egalitarian doctrine and to reach the
merits of important civil rights cases.
D. Contemporary Harms of the State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine continues to harm individuals and
groups—particularly groups that face discrimination in daily life—to
this day. The contemporary harms of the state action doctrine cut
across a wide array of constitutional norms and individual rights. As
Professor Chemerinsky noted, “the courts have tolerated the violation
of virtually every constitutional value, dismissing challenges to alleged
infringements because of the absence of state action.”224 One espe-
cially salient contemporary ramification of the state action doctrine
involves LGBTQ discrimination in access to public accommodations.
Laws granting LGBTQ persons equal access to places of public ac-
commodation are strikingly deficient. Although federal law has, since
1964, prohibited a small number of public accommodations from dis-
criminating “on the ground of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin,”225 currently there is no federal law prohibiting public
220. Brentwood, 531 U.S. 288, 303 (2001).
221. Id. at 302 (“Entwinement will support a conclusion that an ostensibly private
organization ought to be charged with a public character and judged by constitutional
standards; entwinement to the degree shown here requires it.”).
222. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2008, 2024–25 (2002).
223. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8 (1948) (comparing Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926)).
224. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 510.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
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accommodations generally from discriminating on the basis of sex,
sexual orientation, or gender identity.226 Only twenty-one states—and
the District of Columbia—have enacted state statutes prohibiting
businesses from denying access to public accommodations on the basis
of sexual orientation.227 There are even fewer state statutes prohibit-
ing businesses from denying access to public accommodations on the
basis of gender identity.228 While forty-five states prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sex in public accommodations,229 so far very few courts
have suggested that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination.230 Only one state, New Jersey, has a common law rule
mandating equal access to places of public accommodation.231 Missis-
sippi is the only state that expressly grants public accommodations the
power to refuse to serve customers for any reason.232
The state action doctrine exacerbates this scant sub-constitutional
protection for LGBTQ individuals within places of public accommo-
dation. It does so by shielding private LGBTQ discrimination from
constitutional scrutiny in a manner similar to the historical immuniza-
tion of private racial discrimination from constitutional scrutiny.233
The combination of inadequate sub-constitutional protection and a
formalistic application of the state action doctrine means that LGBTQ
persons—like Dorian, introduced at the beginning of this Article—
can legally be denied access to places of public accommodation in
twenty-nine states to this very day on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion. Dorian—and others like him—can never take for granted that
226. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
227. See Isaac Saidel-Goley, The Right Side Of History: Prohibiting Sexual Orienta-
tion Discrimination In Public Accommodations, Housing, And Employment, 31 WIS.
J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 117, 121–22 (2016).
228. New Hampshire and Wisconsin prohibit businesses from denying access to
public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation, but gender identity is not
protected. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 106.52 (West
Supp. 2017); WIS. STAT. § 106.52 (2014).
229. Saidel-Goley, supra note 5, at 148–50; Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion
in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 631, 637 (2016).
230. While the West Virginia Supreme Court recently adopted the traditional view
that discrimination because of sexual orientation is not a form of sex discrimination,
State v. Butler, 799 S.E.2d 718, 728 (W.Va. 2017) (hate crime against two gay men did
not constitute criminal civil rights violation willfully injuring a person “because of
such other person’s . . . sex”), the Seventh Circuit came to the opposite view in Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 349–52 (7th Cir. 2017) on the ground
that such discrimination is based on requiring conformity to a particular gender idea
of masculinity or femininity and because the sex of one’s romantic or sexual partner
or that of the person to whom one is attracted or oriented is the deciding factor in the
discriminatory treatment. See also Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195,
200–01 (2d Cir. 2017) (although bound by precedent to hold the opposite, the court
argued that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination).
231. See Saidel-Goley, supra note 227, at 122.
232. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17 (2014).
233. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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they will be welcome and provided service in a restaurant, hotel, store,
or doctor’s office.
III. RESTATING THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. Precedent & Principle
The preceding Sections of this Article outlined the history and
harms of the state action doctrine. This Section offers analysis by the
way of a restatement. It seeks both to accurately reflect existing doc-
trine and to reconcile conflicting precedents. The cases outlined above
are contradictory in the sense that there are both competing lines of
precedent and holdings that cannot easily be reconciled. How should
we deal with case law that cannot easily be described in a coherent
manner? Two different approaches exist.
The first way to restate and reconcile incoherent lines of cases is to
limit some of the cases to their facts, making them inapplicable to situ-
ations not exactly “on point.” That way of restating the law eschews
formally overruling any cases while depriving some of them of force in
the future. It is a way to avoid the consequences of unwelcome prece-
dents by marginalizing them without developing a full-fledged theory
about why they cannot be reconciled with the mainstream cases.
The second way to reconcile conflicting precedents is to explicate
the norms and values underlying the cases, and to reinterpret the
precedents to reflect those underlying, often competing principles.
This method may require broadening the scope or holding of some
cases and narrowing, or even overruling, the holdings of others. This
approach will almost always acknowledge that the field is incoherent
either (1) because of historical change over time in normative thinking
or social conditions; or (2) because the precedents implicate conflict-
ing norms, values, and principles, and drawing a defensible line be-
tween the competing considerations is difficult and cannot be
accomplished in a crisp, mechanical fashion. At the same time, this
approach seeks to give reasons to privilege some norms over others in
particular social or legal contexts.234
The Authors take the second approach because it more honestly
recognizes the role the state plays in regulating relationships, and be-
cause it is more compatible with rule of law norms that seek to create
reflective equilibrium between principles and cases and seeks to draw
lines that can be publicly justified to all affected by them.
Either approach requires a substantive judgment that details which
cases to foreground and make salient and which cases to place in the
background or even discard. A court could, for example, limit to their
facts cases like Shelley v. Kraemer, New York Times v. Sullivan, Evans
234. See also Schmidt, supra note 133, at 579 (“What scholars lament as a failure of
principled reasoning or legal craft may create valuable opportunities for those who
seek to use the law to effect social change.”).
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v. Newton, and Reitman v. Mulkey. A court could say that those cases,
if interpreted broadly, could have the effect of eliminating the state
action doctrine all together. This would subject all private decisions to
public norms in violation of principles of individual liberty. Thus,
those cases cannot be core examples of what constitutes state action.
Such a choice would insulate common law rules, including rules that
confer freedom of action from constitutional scrutiny. It would also
promote social hierarchy and relationships of domination. Or a court
could choose the opposite path. This path seriously considers the rea-
sons those cases applied constitutional norms to relationships that
might, at first glance, seem to be in the private sphere but which, on
second glance, implicate public norms because they concern matters
of public interest and activity that takes place in the public sphere.
Taking the second approach, the Authors find that existing law
holds that “state action” is present at least when (1) someone is ar-
rested or prosecuted; (2) a court issues an order; (3) the government
enforces or encourages a custom; or (4) the government makes an al-
locative decision. A state action finding does not automatically mean
that someone’s constitutional rights have been violated. A substantive
determination must be made regarding what constitutional rights are,
or are not, implicated in the context in question. At the same time, at
least in these cases, courts should not short-circuit the substantive
analysis by employing the fiction that the state has not “acted.” State
involvement in such cases can no longer remain invisible. That means
that the state’s choice of law must be consistent with constitutional
norms, including norms of equality and norms of free association and
privacy.
B. Restatement of State Action
1. State Action is Present When Someone is
Arrested or Prosecuted
Courts should find state action when the government arrests or
prosecutes any person. That means that when the government uses
the criminal justice system to enforce discriminatory exclusion from
places of public accommodation, courts should find state action. That
action also denies equal protection of law, at least when no competing
rights to association or privacy hold sway. Discriminatory exclusion
from public accommodations unconstitutionally denies access to the
market without a legitimate government interest in doing so.
The government’s use of the criminal justice system to restrain the
liberty of a person is perhaps the most obvious instance of “state ac-
tion.” This is especially clear within the context of using the criminal
justice system to enforce discriminatory exclusion from places of pub-
lic accommodation. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that
arrest and prosecution, even within the context of discriminatory ex-
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clusion from places of public accommodation, constitutes state action
for the purposes of an equal protection challenge. The previously dis-
cussed line of cases culminating in Bell v. Maryland came very close to
deciding this question but ultimately failed to do so.235 Courts should
embrace the reasoning of the Douglas and Goldberg concurrence in
Bell v. Maryland and hold that arrest and prosecution always consti-
tute state action.236
The cases that refused to hold that arrest and prosecution constitute
state action have erroneously conflated two parts of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause test: (1) state action; and (2) denial of equal protection of
law. By conflating these two prongs, the cases used the state action
doctrine to summarily dismiss equal protection claims without even
reaching the substantive question of whether arrest and prosecution
constitute discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
For example, Justice Harlan in Peterson v. Greenville noted that the
Court’s holding “does not suggest that [state] action, denying equal
protection, may be found in the mere enforcement of trespass laws in
relation to private business establishments from which the manage-
ment, of its own free will, has chosen to exclude persons of the Negro
race.”237 This confuses the question of whether the state is acting with
whether the action is unconstitutional. Courts should not conflate
state action with discriminatory denial of equal protection. In other
words, courts should not determine that there is no state action when
what the court actually believes is that there is not a denial of constitu-
tional equality. Courts should, at the very least, acknowledge that ar-
rest and prosecution constitute state action under the Constitution,
regardless of whether that action rises to the level of denial of equal
protection of the law.
The Douglas and Goldberg concurrence in Bell v. Maryland pro-
vides a framework for the Court to follow in establishing the principle
that arrest and prosecution always constitute state action under the
Equal Protection Clause. The concurrence can also provide a frame-
work for the principle that arrest and prosecution enforcing discrimi-
natory exclusion from public accommodations constitute
discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.238 At the beginning of their concurrence, Justices Douglas and
Goldberg chastised the Court for “studiously avoid[ing] decision of
235. See Bell, 378 U.S. at 239 (1964) (holding that “the supervening enactment of
the city and state public accommodations laws” compelled reconsideration of the con-
victions by the lower court, rendering the constitutional question moot).
236. Id. at 242–60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
237. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
238. Bell, 378 U.S. at 242–60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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the basic issue of the right of public accommodation under the Four-
teenth Amendment.”239
They framed the basic issue as follows: “The clash between Negro
customers and white restaurant owners is clear; each group claims
protection by the Constitution and tenders the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as justification for its action.”240 Then, Justices Douglas and
Goldberg emphasized the fundamentally public nature of places of
public accommodation as “facilities whose only claim to existence is
serving the public.”241 Specifically, they emphasized that “[t]he prop-
erty involved is not. . . a man’s home or his yard or even his fields.
Private property is involved, but it is property that is serving the pub-
lic.”242 They then distinguished places of public accommodation from
private property not open to the general public. This provided a limit-
ing principle to protect a sphere of privacy from constitutional scru-
tiny: “The problem with which we deal has no relation to opening or
closing the door of one’s home. The home of course is the essence of
privacy, in no way dedicated to public use, in no way extending an
invitation to the public.”243
The issue was not whether the state was acting; the state is always
acting when it enforces trespass law.244 The issue was whether the
Constitution’s equality provisions ensure equal access to public ac-
commodations.245 Finding state action would not automatically mean
that every exclusion from property violates someone’s constitutional
rights.246 Only property open to the public or open for sale or rental in
the real estate market raises issues of denial of equality.247
They then highlighted the obvious existence of state action in the
several layers of government enforcing discriminatory exclusion
through trespass laws.
Maryland’s action against these Negroes was as authoritative as any
case where the State in one way or another puts its full force behind
a policy. The policy here was segregation in places of public accom-
modation; and Maryland enforced that policy with her police, her
prosecutors, and her courts.248
Finally, Justices Douglas and Goldberg invoked Shelley v. Kraemer,
and analogized the state action inherent in arrest and prosecution to
the state action inherent in judicial orders. The Justices concluded that
enforcement of discriminatory exclusion through arrest, prosecution,
239. Id. at 242.
240. Id. at 243.
241. Id. at 247.
242. Id. at 252.
243. Id. at 253.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 252.
247. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
248. Bell, 378 U.S. at 257 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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and conviction constitutes state action that denies equal protection of
law.
We should put these restaurant cases in line with Shelley v. Krae-
mer, holding that what the Fourteenth Amendment requires in re-
strictive covenant cases it also requires from restaurants. . . . When
the state police, the state prosecutor, and the state courts unite to con-
vict Negroes for renouncing that relic of slavery, the ‘State’ violates
the Fourteenth Amendment.249
Courts should adopt the approach endorsed decades ago by Justices
Douglas and Goldberg. They should disentangle the question of state
action from discriminatory denial of equality and should acknowledge
that arrest and prosecution—like a court order—is always state action
under the Constitution.250 Of course, this conclusion (that the state is
acting) does not settle the question of whether the state action violates
the Equal Protection Clause. Courts must still analyze the particular
context, the rule in question, the parties’ relationships, and substan-
tive constitutional norms (such as equality and freedom of associa-
tion). Then, courts must determine whether the state action creates a
denial of equal protection in the context in question.
Governmental enforcement of discriminatory exclusion at places of
public accommodation—through common law authorization and
criminal trespass statutes, followed by arrest and prosecution for tres-
pass—categorically effects a denial of equal protection in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. It does so because it denies individuals
the right to contract and to acquire property and to exercise liberties
for discriminatory reasons that cannot be indulged in a free and demo-
cratic society that refuses to establish or enforce a social caste system
that relegates a minority group to the fringes of society. This determi-
nation is consistent with the principle established several decades ago
in Shelley v. Kraemer, and it is consistent with contemporary under-
standings of equality and dignity.251
2. State Action is Present When a Court Issues an Order
Courts should also find state action when a court issues an order.252
This principle, mandated by Shelley v. Kraemer, would remove the
shield of state action from cases in which the state enforced discrimi-
natory exclusion through the court system.253 In Shelley v. Kraemer
the Court unambiguously held that courts are state actors and that
court orders are state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth
249. Id. at 259–60 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
252. See id. at 14.
253. Id. at 16.
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Amendment.254 New York Times v. Sullivan is consistent with that
rule of law.255 The Shelley Court further held that the judicial enforce-
ment of private racially restrictive covenants constituted discrimina-
tory state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.256 This
revolutionary case, properly understood, effected a fundamental re-
formulation of the state action doctrine by removing the shield of
state action whenever state court orders are enforced.257 After Shel-
ley, even if a case initially lacked state action as traditionally under-
stood by the Court, it would acquire state action the moment a state
court decided the case and ordered someone to do something—like
vacating and selling their home.258
Consider the introductory scenario involving Dorian as an applica-
tion of this principle. A place of public accommodation excluded Do-
rian because of his sexual orientation. That discriminatory exclusion
would be shielded from constitutional scrutiny under the Court’s
traditional, formalistic formulation of the state action doctrine. The
use of police, prosecutors, and state judges to enforce the discrimina-
tory exclusion involves state action. But, the Court has not yet em-
braced such a broad formulation of the state action doctrine. Clearly,
under Shelley, state action is unquestionably present the moment the
state court upheld Dorian’s conviction and enforced it.259 Rather than
magically rendering the state action invisible, the U.S. Supreme Court,
applying Shelley, should have no trouble locating state action in the
state court order.260 Moreover, the Court should hold that the state
court orders (finding Dorian to have committed a crime and then af-
firming his conviction) constitute discriminatory state action that vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause to the same degree as the court
order upholding the racially restrictive covenant in Shelley.261
254. Id. at 14 (holding that the “action of state courts and judicial officers in their
official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
255. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
256. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20. (“We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of
the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal
protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot
stand.”).
257. See id.
258. Professor Laurence Tribe discusses this application of Shelley in his book
“Constitutional Choices.” See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
246–66 (1985). See also Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opin-
ion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 486 (1962) (“the state is responsible when its courts act to
render discrimination effective.”) (italics in original).
259. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1.
260. See id.
261. See id.
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3. State Action is Present When the Government Enforces or
Encourages a Custom
Courts should also find state action when the government enforces
or encourages a custom. Further, when the government encourages or
enforces a custom of discriminatory exclusion from places of public
accommodation, courts should find that that state action denies equal
protection of law. The presence or absence of state action should not
turn on whether the government explicitly encourages discrimination
through written law. Implicit encouragement through unwritten cus-
tom that is publicized, favored, encouraged, or advocated by state ac-
tors implicates the state in the discrimination it promotes.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co. supports this principle.262 In Adickes, the
Supreme Court concluded that “settled practices of state officials may,
by imposing sanctions or withholding benefits, transform private
predilections into compulsory rules of behavior no less than legislative
pronouncements.”263 Noting that “a state official might act to give a
custom the force of law in a variety of ways,”264 the Court highlighted
two examples. First, the government might encourage a custom of dis-
crimination through the use of “false arrest for vagrancy for the pur-
pose of harassing and punishing” those who violate the custom.265
Second, the government might “intentionally tolerate violence or
threats of violence directed toward those who violated the [cus-
tom].”266 Building on these examples, the Court held that “[f]or state
action purposes it makes no difference of course whether the racially
discriminatory act by the private party is compelled by a statutory pro-
vision or by a custom having the force of law—in either case it is the
State that has commanded the result by its law.”267 In other words, the
Court reasoned that governmental practices (e.g., practices in polic-
ing, prosecution, or administrative benefits) that encourage or enforce
a custom of discrimination are instances of state action, and that state
action can effect a denial of equality in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.268
Lombard v. Louisiana further supports this principle.269 In Lom-
bard, the Supreme Court found state action in public statements made
by the New Orleans mayor and the superintendent of police that con-
demned sit-ins and denounced racially integrated service at lunch
counters.270 As the Court noted in Adickes, “the statements of the
262. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
263. Id. at 168.
264. Id. at 172.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 171.
268. See id.
269. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
270. Id. at 270–71.
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chief of police and mayor of New Orleans, as interpreted by the Court
in Lombard v. Louisiana . . . could well have been taken by restaurant
proprietors as articulating a custom having the force of law.”271 In
other words, the practice of state officials could be interpreted as hav-
ing encouraged a custom of discrimination, thereby violating the
Equal Protection Clause.272
Even the Civil Rights Cases support this principle.273 The Court in
the Civil Rights Cases repeatedly discussed “customs having the force
of law” together with other—more explicit—state actions like “law,
statute, ordinance, [and] regulation.”274 The Court concluded that
state action might take “the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or ex-
ecutive proceedings.”275
Courts should follow the reasoning of Adickes and Lombard.276
Courts should find state action whenever the government encourages
or enforces a custom, and they should find state action denying equal
protection when the government encourages or enforces a custom of
discriminatory exclusion from places of public accommodation.277
What might this form of state action mean for gay rights? It turns
out to mean quite a lot. Until 2003, only fifteen years ago, many states
criminalized same-sex sexual contact. That only stopped with the deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas.278 That was the same year that same-sex
marriage was recognized for the first time in U.S. history in Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health.279 It was not until 2015, just three
years ago, in Obergefell v. Hodges,280 that same-sex marriage became
the law of the land. Until quite recently, many states not only en-
couraged but demanded discriminatory treatment of LGTBQ persons.
Recent laws and bills that seek to create religious exemptions from
public accommodation laws should be understood in a similar light.
Such laws are not neutral; they are intended to encourage those who
do not believe LGBTQ persons should have civil rights to act on their
beliefs. In the light of centuries of laws and customs pushing LGBTQ
persons into the closet and the jails of this nation, laws that promote
exclusion because of sexual orientation should be understood as state-
enforced customs designed to make it impossible for LGBTQ persons
to enter public accommodations without worrying about whether they
are welcome.
271. Adickes, 398 U.S. 144 at 168–69.
272. See id.
273. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
274. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 168–69 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)).
275. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17.
276. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144; see Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
277. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144; see Lombard, 373 U.S. at 267.
278. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
279. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
280. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-3\TWL303.txt unknown Seq: 45 24-MAY-18 10:47
2018] THINGS INVISIBLE TO SEE 483
4. State Action is Present When the Government Makes
an Allocative Decision
This last category is the hardest to restate. In Reitman v. Mulkey,
the Supreme Court held that state action was present when California
repealed a fair housing law.281 California citizens amended the state
constitution to repeal the state fair housing statute, which prohibited
private parties from discriminating in the sale or rental of housing.282
The Court held that this amendment constituted state action with the
purpose of both condoning and encouraging discrimination and,
therefore, it violated the Equal Protection Clause.283
One way to understand this case is that the state acted to rescind a
previously protected right that guaranteed nondiscriminatory access
to the marketplace. When the government rescinds a previously pro-
tected right prohibiting discriminatory exclusion from places of public
accommodation, courts should find state action denying equal protec-
tion. The repeal of legislative or regulatory protection should consti-
tute discriminatory state action to the same degree as the enactment of
discriminatory legislation or regulation.
Even if further argument is needed to explain why the discrimina-
tion itself violates constitutionally-protected equality norms, we
should not short-circuit that analysis by pretending that the state is not
involved. A law that enables land owners to deny access to the hous-
ing market because of a potential customer’s race, thereby stripping
that customer of the right to purchase housing, is an act of state. In-
deed, there is no actor other than state that has the power to rescind a
fair housing law. Reitman supports the principle that governmental re-
peal of legislation or regulation, even when enacted directly by the
citizenry in a statewide referendum, is state action for the purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause.284
There is another way to understand Reitman.285 Prior fair housing
law granted the public rights of access to housing without regard to
race, prohibiting racially-motivated denials of housing opportunities.
That right can be understood as a public easement of access to the
housing market without regard to race. The constitutional amendment
stripped the public of that easement and, instead, granted housing
owners the power to refuse service because of race—a right prior law
denied them. Both the prior law and the new law allocated property
rights. The laws were allocative in nature because the two rights could
not exist together. Either there is a duty not to discriminate in the
housing market on the basis of race or there is no duty. Either one has
a right of access to the market without regard to race or one is vulner-
281. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
282. Id. at 372, 374.
283. Id. at 376, 381.
284. See id. at 376.
285. See id. at 369–81.
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able to exclusion for racially discriminatory reasons. The state must
allocate the entitlement one way or the other. It must, in other words,
act. Inaction is not possible.286
State action is always present when the state acts through the legal
system to allocate property rights, and the state violates the Constitu-
tion when it allocates property rights in a discriminatory manner. The
reallocation of property rights in Reitman meant that African Ameri-
cans lost their right to buy property without regard to race, and ex-
isting owners gained a right to refuse to sell or rent because of the
race of the potential buyer or renter. The constitutional amendment
took property from A and transferred it to B.
Professor Mack has made a similar observation about Bell v. Mary-
land.287 It is generally assumed that owners can exclude as they wish
unless they are common carriers, innkeepers, or are subject to a civil
rights statute that limits their prerogatives.288 But, the line between
those entities that have the obligations of public accommodations and
those that are sufficiently “private” to be free to engage in racial dis-
crimination is a line that has changed over the course of U.S. history.
Those changes have occurred because of both statutes and common
law developments.289
When a patron claims a common law right to be served in a place of
public accommodation, common law courts must decide whether the
patron has, or does not have, such a common law right. A ruling either
way is a ruling of law; a ruling either way is state action. The state must
allocate a property right whether it upholds or overrules precedent;
the state must allocate a property right when it determines whether to
apply or distinguish a prior case. The state assigns the entitlement
even if the case is one of first impression whether it gives the owner a
right to exclude or the patron a right to enter. Either way, the state
must act. Either way, the state must make law. Either way, property
rights must be allocated. This observation suggests a way to reconcep-
tualize the state action doctrine by using the insights of property law
theory. That is where the Authors turn next.
IV. FROM “STATE ACTION” TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
The previous Section proposed several methods for restating the
state action doctrine as developed in case law over time. Here, the
Authors argue that those approaches do not go far enough in re-
286. See id. (explaining this view); Louis Michael Seidman, State Action and the
Constitution’s Middle Band, at 11–14 (2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2962076 [https://perma.cc/D6S6-2GAU] (original intent of Four-
teenth Amendment applied to state inaction that allowed private discriminatory acts
to be inflicted).
287. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Mack, supra note 14, at 365–366.
288. Seidman, supra note 286, at 13.
289. See generally Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 52.
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forming the state action doctrine. To ensure equal protection of law,
the analysis must be refocused on a more progressive conception of
equal protection informed by contemporary understandings of equal-
ity and dignity foundational to a free and democratic society.
The Authors’ argument proceeds as follows. First, the Authors ana-
lyze the insights that can be gleaned from thinking about the common
law governing private property. Second, the Authors argue that those
insights, when combined with established “state action” precedents,
teach that (1) equal protection depends on law, not action; (2) com-
mon law is law that must comply with the Equal Protection Clause;
and (3) common law that allows discriminatory exclusion from the
marketplace violates the Equal Protection Clause.
A. State Action through the Lens of Property Law
It is commonplace to imagine the world as an unregulated state of
nature into which the government intervened after it was created
through a social contract. We have inherited this historical picture
from Hobbes and Locke. The consequence of this fictional construct is
the view that individuals act freely as they desire unless the state steps
in to regulate their conduct. State and society appear separate and
distinct; where the state is, society is not and where society is, the state
is not. The problem with this picture of the relation between state and
society is that it cannot accurately reflect the institution of private
property. The Authors will argue that this is so for five reasons: (1) the
state must decide which property rights it will recognize as valid and
which it will prohibit; (2) property law allocates rights among persons;
(3) property law authorizes as well as prohibits particular property
entitlements; (4) property law regulates externalities by determining
when to protect third parties from the consequences of exercising a
property right and when to leave those parties unprotected; and (5)
property law promotes justice through applying equitable principles to
avoid unjust implications of property law rules.
1. Recognizing Valid and Invalid Property Rights
One of the primary functions of property law is to define property
rights that the legal system will and will not recognize as valid. In con-
trast to contract law, which focuses on formation rules, interpretation
doctrines, and enforcement regimes, property law starts by defining
the “estates” that are valid and those that are unlawful.
To understand why this is so, one need only remember the history
of English and American property law. New York, for example,
passed an act in 1787 abolishing feudal estates. New Jersey similarly
divested the “lords of New Jersey” (“the lords”) of their noble titles
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and their lordly prerogatives.290 Every state abolished primogeniture,
the fee tail, and any hereditary rights to public offices. England previ-
ously introduced multiple waves of law reform to protect the property
rights of the lords from dispossession by the Crown while limiting the
lords’ powers over their tenants. A nation of small farm owners
emerged in the United States because the law transferred property
rights from lords to the tenants living on the land and abolished feudal
contractual relationships. To do that, the law prohibited most re-
straints on alienation and imposed a strict restraint on alienation for
land owned by Indian nations.
In addition, the estates system, through the numerus clausus princi-
ple, limits which property rights will be recognized by the legal system.
When a seller or donor conveys a property right, the courts are inter-
ested in what set of rights the seller sought to convey. The court will
also fit that set of rights into an established set, such as fee simple, life
estate, joint tenancy, or trust. The courts do this partly to promote
efficient utilization of land and partly to decentralize power over val-
ued resources, thereby promoting liberty, equality, and democracy.
Anyone who tries to create a fee tail today will be unsuccessful.
State property law will convert those interests into a fee simple. Any-
one who tries to impose a restraint on alienation of a fee simple inter-
est is likely to be successful in only a narrow set of cases. Anyone who
tries to create a homeowners’ association that has the power to divest
an owner of their rights without compensation will be unsuccessful.
State law protects unit owners from unfair retroactive changes in their
property rights.291 Anyone who tries to create a tenancy by the en-
tirety that gives the husband the power to manage the property and
denies any such powers to the wife will be unsuccessful. Such property
rights have been held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.292 Any-
one who wants to create a racially segregated restaurant will be unsuc-
cessful because federal law and (most) state laws prohibit this.
Anyone who wants to own a slave will be unsuccessful because the
Thirteenth Amendment intervenes. Anyone who wants to rent resi-
dential housing without complying with the housing code will be un-
successful; the law requires landlords to provide basic services and
habitable housing. Any landlord who wants to prevent a residential
tenant from getting married will be out of luck; the landlord’s rights
do not reach so far.
There is no need to belabor the point. Democracies do not allow for
the creation and enjoyment of all types of property rights no matter
their scope and content. Because free and democratic societies recog-
290. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION: THE
HIDDEN LESSON OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 26–58 (2015).
291. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981).
292. See id.
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nize free and equal persons, many possible property arrangements are
off the table; they are not part of the menu of available options.
This means that private property systems require the state to define
the property rights that it will recognize and the types of human rela-
tionships it will allow. There is no room for the state to step aside and
just let things happen. When someone creates a property right, that
necessarily gives that person power over non-owners. If a dispute
arises between the owner and others, the state has no choice but to
determine whether the property right will—or will not—be recog-
nized. In the context of public accommodation laws, the question is
whether a state may permit owners to refuse service in a discrimina-
tory manner when they open their property to the general public. An-
swering that question requires state action. As Harold Horowitz
noted, “there is state action in the definition and enforcement of the
principle that a landowner is free, if he so wishes, to refuse to sell his
land to a Negro.”293 The only question is whether such state action is
constitutional.294
2. Allocating Rights Among Persons
Professor Laura Underkuffler explains that property rights are un-
like other constitutionally-protected rights. “Property rights,” she ar-
gues, “are allocative because they give to some what cannot be given
to all: they allocate rights to particular individuals in finite, non-
sharable resources.”295 This means that “[i]f the enjoyment of a partic-
ular good by one person is protected, then the enjoyment of that same
good by others is denied.”296 Property rights are different from other
rights for a second reason. “[T]hey alone deal with rights that—at
their most basic level—are necessary for the survival of life itself.”297
The allocational nature of property rights means that the state can-
not help but determine who owns particular resources and what rights
go along with ownership. Either the landlord has the power to evict a
tenant at will (without giving a reason) or the landlord is under an
obligation to continue renting to the tenant unless the landlord can
show just cause to evict. Either an owner has protection from loss of
title to a strip of land occupied by her neighbor for twenty years or the
neighbor has the power to acquire title to that land by adverse posses-
sion. Either an owner has the right to eject a homeless person from his
property or the homeless person has a right to enter the property to
293. Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for “State Action,” 30 S. CAL. L.
REV. 208, 212 (1957).
294. Id. at 213.
295. Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1033, 1038 (1996). See also Moris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 COR-
NELL L. Q. 8, 13 (1927) (property law gives owners “power over the life of others”).
296. Id. at 1039.
297. Id.
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save his life. The state cannot fail to act in cases like this; it must allo-
cate the entitlement to someone and deny it to others; there is simply
no space within which the state can be said to not be acting.
3. Authorizing and Prohibiting Property Rights & Freedoms
Condominiums are a relatively recent invention that came into be-
ing beginning in the 1960s.298 At the outset, it was not clear whether
courts would recognize condominiums as valid property rights.299
Before condominiums, people owned single family homes or they
owned entire buildings, either of which they could rent to others.
Owning an apartment but not the building that it was in was not one
of the options on the property menu. When states authorized develop-
ers to create condominiums, the states acted even though they were
adding a new estate in land to the list of previously authorized estates.
That act of authorizing the creation of condominiums, and later ex-
tending that recognition to homeowners’ associations in residential
neighborhoods, was an act of the state. The state authorized private
actors to create a new property right. The act of authorizing condo-
miniums was as much an act of the state as the prior act of prohibiting
such arrangements. The state must make a choice one way or the
other—to allow or to prohibit. Law is not only involved when the state
prohibits; law is involved when the state permits.
A New Yorker cartoon by Leo Cullum portrays a boardroom with
seven men holding a meeting.300 The one at the head of the table is
laughing. He says: “I was just going to say, ‘Well, I don’t make the
rules.’ But, of course, I do make the rules.”301 Property law is like that.
When the question is whether a property right is valid or not, the state
must say yes or no. The state must answer the question, whether
through a statute or common law. The state must, in other words, take
action. A ruling that a property right will be recognized is as much a
state action as one that says it will not be recognized.302
When an owner complains that their neighbor’s tree blocks sunlight
needed for their rooftop solar panels, the state must choose between
the conflicting property rights. If the state forces the neighbor to cut
the tree in half, the state is acting. The state is equally acting if it al-
lows the tree owner to prevent their neighbor from enjoying the bene-
298. Donna S. Bennett, Condominium Homeownership in the United States: A Se-
lected Annotated Bibliography of Legal Sources, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 249 (2011).
299. Id. at 253.
300. Leo Cullum, I Was Just Going to Say, CONDE´ NAST (Apr. 3, 2017), http://
www.condenaststore.com/-sp/I-was-just-going-to-say-Well-I-don-t-make-the-rules-
But-of-course-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Prints_i8474277_.htm [https://perma.cc/94KK-
S58X].
301. Id.
302. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brotheres v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1315–22 (1982) (arguing that a body of
property law constitutes state action).
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fits of solar panels on their home. When cedar trees on one’s land
contain micro-organisms that destroy the apple trees on the land of
others, the state must choose which property right will survive. If the
state forces the cedar owners to destroy their trees to save the apple
trees, it is acting. However, the state is also acting if it fails to protect
the apple trees owners from communicable diseases being spread by
other land owners. As the Supreme Court explained in Miller v.
Schoene:303
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever
both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the
less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by
doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards
within its borders to go on unchecked.304
Similarly, when someone raises dozens of dogs on their property in
a rural area, creating cacophonous barking that drives the neighbors
crazy, the courts are put in the position of either allowing the barking
to continue—thereby authorizing harm to the neighbors and possibly
inducing them to move—or prohibiting the activity to control the
noise.305  The state acts whether it allows the barking to continue or
orders the owner to limit the barking or soundproof his facility. When
the state authorizes a farm to expand or to locate in a residential area
and to cause substantial and unreasonable harm to the use and enjoy-
ment of neighboring property, the state is acting by depriving those
neighboring owners of the right to be protected from a nuisance, de-
spite the fact that the state is allowing, rather than prohibiting, an ac-
tivity.306 The state, through its courts or its legislature, must choose
which property right to recognize—one of freedom of action or one of
security. Choosing to allow someone to harm others is not inaction,
because the state has the power—and the responsibility—to make the
rules one way or the other. Inaction is not an option.
The state “acts” when it imposes a duty on an owner to use or not
use their property in a particular way, but the state is equally acting
when it rules that a use is permitted when that use affects the interests
and rights of others. If an owner complains that a cell tower on neigh-
boring property is ugly and bothersome because it has flashing red
lights that reflect onto the water on his property all day and all night, a
court must decide whether the tower owner has a duty to turn off the
lights or to relocate the tower. If the tower owner has a duty, and it
corresponds to a right in their neighbor to sue to stop the bothersome
use of the tower owner’s property, then the courts will apply the com-
303. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
304. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
305. Dobbs v. Wiggins, 929 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 2010).
306. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County, 584 N.W.2d 309,
311–12 (Iowa 1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-3\TWL303.txt unknown Seq: 52 24-MAY-18 10:47
490 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
mon law of nuisance and order the tower owner to take down the
tower or turn off the lights. State action through a court order is
obvious.
State action should also be obvious if the court declares the use
privileged by granting the tower owner freedom to build and operate
the tower. Hohfeld would call that freedom a “privilege.”307 The privi-
lege corresponds with the neighbor’s vulnerability that Hohfeld calls
“no-right.”308
Holding that an owner has no duty to take down the tower is a
ruling of law that denies the neighbor any protection from flashing red
lights that invade their land as well as any protection from the enor-
mous structure visible just over the border. A common law ruling that
an act is damnum absque injuria—that it causes damage without legal
redress—is a ruling of law that permits a harmful act and places the
power of the state on the side of the owner who is permitted to engage
in the activity. Sometimes, such acts are so intrusive that they make
the victim’s land unusable.309 Holding that such acts can be engaged
in, with or without compensation, privileges the property rights of one
owner over those of another.
Public accommodations are no different. A ruling that an owner has
a duty to grant access to the public without regard to race, religion, or
sexual orientation places a duty on the store owner enforceable by
court order. Conversely, a ruling that an owner is free to exclude pa-
trons because of race, religion, or sexual orientation also constitutes
state action permitting (authorizing) the owner to deny certain mem-
bers of the general public the same rights to obtain goods and services
in the public accommodation available to other members of the pub-
lic. Permitting exclusion allocates a property right to the store owner
rather than to the patron and conferring permission to exclude is cou-
pled with a right to exclude that places a duty on the patron to stay
out—a right enforceable by criminal trespass statutes.
The state “acts” not only when it coerces but also when it permits.
Such permission entitles a property right to exist and be exercised in a
certain way by a certain class of persons in a certain set of circum-
stances. Exclusion from a public accommodation is not a self-regard-
ing act on the part of the store owner; it harms patrons who are
members of groups facing prejudice by denying them the freedom to
go shopping without calling ahead to see if they will be welcome.
307. Religious Liberty and Public Accommodations: What Would Hohfeld Say? in
WESLEY HOHFELD A CENTURY LATER: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL
PAPERS AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (eds. Shyam Balganesh, Ted Sichelman, &
Henry Smith) (forthcoming, Cambridge U. Press, 2018).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258, 260 (1946) (low-flying
planes over owner’s land constitute a taking by the government when they render the
land unusable).
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If this is hard to understand, consider that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 which grants all persons the “same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens”310 has been interpreted
not only to enable people to enforce contracts that others make with
them but also to place a duty on businesses open to the public to make
contracts with customers without regard to race.311 The right to make
contracts includes the power to enter a retail store and insist on being
served even if the owner wishes not to deal with a customer because
of their race. The freedom to make contracts usually includes the free-
dom to refuse to contract with someone. But, public accommodations
do not have the freedom to refuse service because of race. If they did,
then the freedom to acquire property by purchasing it in a store would
be severely curtailed for those who face widespread prejudice and dis-
criminatory treatment.
Granting a public accommodation the freedom to deny service does
not mean that the state is not involved in the denial. It is intimately
involved because the freedom to deny service entails a common law
ruling that grants the public accommodation owner the right to ex-
clude patrons based on race and denies those patrons the freedom to
shop on the same terms as are enjoyed by the majority citizens. Per-
missive property rights are still property rights, and they exist because
state courts have deemed those rights to be legitimate, and the corre-
sponding harms and vulnerabilities to be ones that the law does not
protect against.312
Recall that southern plantation owners initially refused to contract
with persons who had been enslaved and then tried to recreate slavery
through sharecropping contracts that tied workers to the land through
debt and purchase arrangements that made it legally impossible for
them to leave.313 Requiring plantation owners to contract with Afri-
can American workers and regulating the terms of those agreements
was necessary to preserve the liberty of the workers and to ensure
equal rights to participate in the marketplace without regard to prior
status as an enslaved human being.314 A regime that allowed owners
to refuse to hire newly freed persons or that allowed owners to impose
terms that amounted to slavery in function (if not form), might have
seemed permissive from the standpoint of the land owners. But, it
would have been coercive from the standpoint of those trying to earn
a living in the new “free” world.
310. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
311. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
312. See Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American Property
Law, 1 Ala. C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 83, 109 (2011).
313. See Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916,
1929 (1987).
314. Id. at 1916, 1937–38.
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4. Regulating Externalities
We still have, in 2018, not fully recovered from the subprime mort-
gage disaster.315 That sorry episode involved the creation of property
rights that had the unfortunate side effect of wrecking the world econ-
omy and defrauding both borrowers and investors.316 Toxic assets in
subprime mortgages affected not only the contracting parties but eve-
ryone else.317 Racial covenants are no different. They may seem to
affect only the covenanting parties, but obviously they are intended to
prevent others from moving into the neighborhood. If commonly
practiced, racial covenants create an apartheid system as effective as
one imposed by segregation statutes.
South Africa confronted a choice when it abolished apartheid in the
1990s.318 At that time, roughly 10% of the population owned 90% of
the land. Those 10% were white, while the non-owners were black.319
Moreover, a significant portion of that white-owned land was taken
from black owners many years earlier. The new constitution abolished
the apartheid laws. Was the abolition of apartheid laws sufficient to
abolish apartheid?
Not at all. If white owners refused to sell their homes to black buy-
ers, if public accommodations refused to serve black customers, if
white employers refused to hire black workers, then the property
owners could have continued to deny access to property to the black
majority. Apartheid would have continued through the mechanism of
private property law.320 As Louis Michael Seidman notes, “private ac-
tion always occurs in the context of background state action that
molds and enables private choice.”321 Property rights have externali-
ties, and the state must choose whether or not to protect society (and
third parties) from those externalities. The state cannot say “don’t ask
me, I don’t make the rules.” The state does make the rules, and the
rules matter.
315. See Lydia DePillis, 10 Years After the Recession Began, Have Americans Re-
covered?, CNN (Dec. 1, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/01/news/economy/reces
sion-anniversary/index.html [https://perma.cc/YPR8-CT8Z].
316. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, Or
Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 533
(2013).
317. Id.
318. Edward Lahiff, Q&A: Land Reform in South Africa, PBS (July 6, 2010), http://
www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/land-reform-in-south-africa/ [https://perma.cc/8TLQ-
CVHL].
319. Id.
320. See SINGER, supra note 290, at 54. See also Singer, Anti-Apartheid Principle,
supra note 312, at 92–93.
321. Seidman, supra note 286, at 17.
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5. Correcting Injustice through Equitable Principles
Property law is replete with doctrines that seek to promote justice.
Many are based on traditional equitable principles such as reliance,
laches, unclean hands, and estoppel. Others are based on recognizing
rights from relationships, while others reflect antidiscrimination prin-
ciples. All of these doctrines balance interests of competing parties,
and the method of balancing is not neutral or disinterested. The goal
of these doctrines is to avoid injustice. In each case, the state is con-
fronted with stark choices about which interests should prevail when a
case presents plausible conflicting claims to property. The goal of pro-
moting justice is what makes a claim plausible, even if formal law
would assign the property right to someone else.
Property law generally requires heightened formality in order to
clarify who owns what. The statute of frauds is most strictly enforced
in the area of real property.322 But, despite the need for clear title and
formal means to transfer property rights, many doctrines recognize
that expectations arise from informal arrangements and relationships
as well as formal contracts, deeds, wills, and trusts. Courts have recog-
nized that those expectations are often justified.323 The exceptions are
justified because people trust others who make oral representations to
them or who create long-term relationships with them, and people can
be forgiven for failing to poison the relationship by insisting on a writ-
ing. The exceptions are justified because people make mistakes—a lot
of them—and the law cannot function to protect expectations if it
does not recognize what expectations actually are.
Doctrines that recognize rights from informal arrangements in-
clude: adverse possession, prescriptive easements, easements implied
from prior use, easements by necessity, implied reciprocal negative
servitudes, acquiescence, estoppel, oral agreement about land bound-
aries, and constructive trusts, among others.
Doctrines that allocate property rights based on relationships in-
clude: constructive trusts, equitable distribution of property on di-
vorce, community property, statutory share provision for surviving
spouses, homestead laws, partition of property held in joint tenancy or
tenancy in common, and leasehold arrangements that create expecta-
tions that housing will comply with relevant building codes. Property
law also protects justified expectations by protecting prior noncon-
forming uses and granting variances in zoning law, as well as protect-
ing reasonable, investment-backed expectations (or vested rights)
under both zoning and regulatory takings law.
322. Lawrence M. Boesch, MAGNIFICENT EXCEPTIONS Practitioners Can
Sometimes Overcome a Statute of Frauds Defense by Asserting Equitable Estoppel,
L.A. LAW. 38, 38–39 (May 2001).
323. See generally Joseph Wiliam Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1373 (2013); Joseph Wiliam Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 658 (1988).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-3\TWL303.txt unknown Seq: 56 24-MAY-18 10:47
494 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
Since the 1960s, property law has protected access to both commer-
cial and residential property without regard to race. With regard to
public accommodations, the law in almost all states protects access
without regard to race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability. With
regard to housing, access extends to persons without regard to multi-
ple factors, including sex, disability, familial status, religion, national
origin, and increasingly sexual orientation and gender identity. Anti-
discrimination law has become a core aspect of American property
law. If we consider statutes to be as important as common law—and
why on earth would we not accept that fact?—then property law in
the twenty-first century is premised on a foundational norm of equal
access to property markets.
It is true that the list of protected categories changed over time, and
it is also true that the list of places considered to be public accommo-
dations also changed over time.324 But what cannot be contested is the
fact that the states and the federal government have made laws deter-
mining when an owner is free to refuse service to customers and when
an owner is not free to refuse service. This is not a choice that the
state can avoid. It is an allocative decision; the state will act whether it
gives owners the freedom to refuse service because of the owner’s re-
ligious beliefs or it gives customers a right to access public accommo-
dations without regard to sexual orientation. State action is present
either way.
B. Equal Protection of Law
1. Equal Protection Depends on Law, Not Action
The word “action” is not mentioned in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.325 The Equal Protection Clause maintains that “[n]o State shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”326 Law is central, not action.327 The state action doctrine is
a judicial invention that originated in cases like the Civil Rights
Cases328 and Virginia v. Rives.329 The focus on “action” is fundamen-
324. Compare the short list in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a, with the much longer list in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12181.
325. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
326. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
327. Black, supra note 15, at 93 (describing the views of Harold W. Horowitz in his
article, The Misleading Search for “State Action,” supra note 293, that, in Black’s
words, “state action always enfolds private action, because the state always attributes
some legal significance to private action”; what matters is not the presence of state
action but “the constitutionality of that ‘state action’ which is always present”).
328. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. at 11 (“It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-
matter of the amendment.”).
329. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (“[T]he provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution . . . all have reference to State action exclusively, and
not to any action of private individuals.”).
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tally misguided. The judiciary consistently acknowledged that inaction
can effect an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. For example,
in U.S. v. Hall, the earliest case to interpret the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the United States Supreme Court held that “[d]enying includes
inaction as well as action, and denying the equal protection of the laws
includes the omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws
for protection.”330 The Court further held that:
The citizen of the United States is entitled to the enforcement of the
laws for the protection of his fundamental rights, as well as the en-
actment of such laws. Therefore, to guard against the invasion of the
citizen’s fundamental rights, and to insure their adequate protec-
tion, as well against state legislation as state inaction, or incompe-
tency, the amendment gives congress the power to enforce its
provisions by appropriate legislation.331
Many legal scholars reached the same conclusion. For example, Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky noted that “a state denies and deprives rights and
equality if it fails to stop private invasions or denies redress for viola-
tions.”332 Professor Black similarly stressed that “[i]naction, rather ob-
viously, is the classic and often the most efficient way of ‘denying
protection.’”333
2. Common Law is Law, which Must Comply with
the Equal Protection Clause
Common law is an important component of the “laws” of which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens “equal protection.”
Courts have recognized that common law is subject to the Constitu-
tion to the same degree as statutory law. For example, the Court in
New York Times v. Sullivan struck down a common law libel rule as
unconstitutional. The Court noted that:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
statute. . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been
330. U.S. v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (1871); Mack, supra note 14, at 358.
331. Id. See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961)
(“By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a
party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and pres-
tige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint partici-
pant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have
been so ‘purely private’ as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
332. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 522.
333. Black, supra note 15, at 73.
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applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised.334
Professor Gardbaum agreed that “[t]he common law at issue in pri-
vate litigation is subject to the Constitution in precisely the same way
as statutory private and public law.”335
Common law rules can be active or passive, mandatory or permis-
sive.336 They can require private parties to take action or refrain from
taking certain actions, or they can permit private parties to take or
refrain from certain actions. For example, the common law rules of
every state, except New Jersey, appear to permit places of public ac-
commodation to exclude patrons on the basis of characteristics like
race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.337 In con-
trast, the New Jersey common law rules prohibit places of public ac-
commodation from arbitrarily or unreasonably denying service to any
potential patron.338 These varying common law rules are equally sub-
ject to the strictures of the Constitution. Regardless of their status,
common law rules must not “deny to any person . . . the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”339 In Professor Gardbaum’s words, “[a]ll state laws,
permissive and mandatory alike, are equally and directly subject to
the Constitution under the Supremacy Clause.”340 There are cases
where the state has a duty to prohibit certain types of conduct. The
state does not escape its constitutional equal protection obligations
when the state allows people to harm each other, whether physically
or through discriminatory denial of services.341
3. Common Law That Allows Discriminatory Exclusion from the
Marketplace Violates the Equal Protection Clause
If state common law required places of public accommodation to
exclude patrons on the basis of characteristics like race, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, or gender identity, it would unquestionably violate
the Equal Protection Clause in the same way that a statute requiring
such discrimination would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Com-
mon law rules that authorize discriminatory exclusion from places of
public accommodation, like the current common law rules of every
334. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
335. Gardbaum, supra note 9, at 420.
336. Id. at 439 (“Both mandatory and permissive laws are laws of the state. . . .
Thus, a state law expressly permitting racial segregation in public schools is undoubt-
edly unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause just as the state law requir-
ing such segregation invalidated in Brown.”).
337. See Singer, supra note 52, at 1290.
338. See Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375 (N.J. 1982).
339. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
340. See Gardbaum, supra note 9, at 426.
341. See Seidman, supra note 286, at 16 (explaining that the contrary view charac-
terizing the conventional understanding of the state action doctrine as defining an
area where the state can act, but is not obligated to do so).
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state, except New Jersey,342 should also be understood to not only be
subject to the Equal Protection Clause but to violate it.343 In other
words, the Equal Protection Clause infuses the common law with an
equality principle that requires equal access to places of public
accommodation.344
This proposition may seem surprising, but it is grounded in the same
cases responsible for the state action doctrine and all of its woes: the
Civil Rights Cases. The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases as-
sumed that the common law guaranteed equal access to places of pub-
lic accommodation. Specifically, the Court noted:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such [state]
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an
invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they
affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanc-
tioned in some way by the State, or not done under State authority,
his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by
resort to the laws of the State for redress.345
As Professor Chemerinsky explained, this passage demonstrates that:
“[I]n announcing the state action doctrine, the Court assumed that the
common law protected against private discrimination and private vio-
lations of rights, and held that private discrimination in accommoda-
tions, restaurants, and transportation was not controlled by the
Constitution, but rather prohibited by the common law.”346
Professor Tribe similarly concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court as-
sumed . . . that the right to nondiscriminatory treatment was an aspect
of an individual’s common law liberty.”347 As Professor Chemerinsky
concluded, “the key point is that in the Civil Rights Cases, which are
342. See Singer, supra note 52, at 1290.
343. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurispru-
dence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 673, 705
(1989) (history teaches that “we cannot leave our most precious human rights to the
exclusive vagaries of state court protection”). Contra, Horowitz, supra note 293, at
213 (arguing that it is not unconstitutional for a state to “permit a landowner to dis-
criminate on the basis of race in selling his land”).
344. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telephase
of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 55–56 (1967) (arguing that the
equal protection clause places an “obligation” on the states to adopt laws that “com-
mand some minimum level of equality” by preventing invidious discrimination in pri-
vate property markets). Cf. James M. Oleske, Jr., “State Inaction,” Equal Protection,
and Religious Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 COLO. L. REV. 1 (2016) (state failure to
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause if the
state prohibits other forms of discrimination but not otherwise). For an argument that
the common law itself should be interpreted or modernized to prohibit sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in public accommodations even if this is not required by the Equal
Protection Clause, see Paul Vincent Courtney, Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination in Public Accommodations: A Common Law Approach, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1497 (2015).
345. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17, 25–26.
346. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 515.
347. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1152 (1978).
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viewed as the source of the state action requirement, the Court’s deci-
sion relies in large part on an assumption of effective common-law
protection against private discrimination.”348
If we remove the assumption of effective common law protection
against private discrimination, an assumption central to the Court’s
establishment of the state action doctrine, the state action doctrine
becomes particularly unstable. If owners of public accommodations
are free to engage in invidious discrimination and the state will en-
force their property rights via application of civil and criminal trespass
law, the state is delegating power to public accommodation owners to
deny marketplace access for irrelevant and oppressive reasons. If the
common law provides no right to enter public accommodations with-
out regard to race or sexual orientation, the common law loses its
claim to providing the “equal protection of the laws.”349
If this conclusion is surprising, consider what legal framework we
would face if Congress repealed Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and no federal statute prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race in public accommodations. Imagine
that a state had no state law prohibiting such discrimination, like
Texas. Imagine also that Texas common law allowed all owners to re-
fuse service or to provide discriminatory, unequal services for any rea-
son—including race. Imagine that racial prejudice was widespread in
the state and that few if any businesses were owned by or open to
African American patrons. Imagine that it was hard to find a store
that would serve you if you were African American and that those
that did serve you refused to let you try on clothes, required you to
move to the back of the line if white people approached the checkout
counter, and accosted you with racist epithets as you shopped. Imag-
ine finally, that one or two cities in the state had stores that provided
equal access to African Americans but that 90% of the state was com-
posed of small towns or rural areas where prejudice and discrimina-
tion were widespread and commonly accepted. People would either
have to move to the city or to another state in order to shop without
calling ahead to see if they are welcome. People might not be able to
buy certain goods or services at all without traveling to the few accom-
modating municipalities that serve them. Would such a legal system be
immune from challenge under the Equal Protection Clause?
If the answer is yes, then African Americans would face a segre-
gated market system that was functionally similar to what was faced
under a regime of mandated segregation. If the state allows, but does
not mandate, discriminatory treatment, the functional results are the
same as they would be if the state mandated discriminatory treatment.
348. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 516.
349. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
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Then the question is whether the state bears any responsibility for this
state of affairs. The answer to that question should be yes.
The state is responsible for its common law, and it is responsible for
defining which property rights can be legitimately recognized. If the
state authorizes a property rights regime that functions like an
apartheid regime, it is responsible for that system. It makes no differ-
ence that the discrimination is based on “private” prejudice. What
matters is the state definition of property rights—something only the
state can do and a function that is decidedly public in nature. The state
has granted owners of public accommodations the power to call on
police, prosecutors, and judges to punish individuals who claim the
same right to contract as is enjoyed by white citizens. This is not a case
where the state is not acting; nor is it a case where the state has no
role to play in empowering and perpetuating a racial caste system. The
state creates, defines, and enforces its common law of private property
and, in so doing, it denied, or severely constricted, African Americans
the freedom to pursue happiness, while sending a message of racial
inferiority.
One cannot contract for or purchase property if no one will deal
with them because of their race. And if one cannot acquire property,
one cannot own it. Such a regime denies property rights on the basis
of race. The right to deny service or to provide discriminatory service
based on race in a public accommodation is not a property right com-
patible with equality under the law. A state that recognizes such a
private property right has violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Why does exclusion from a public accommodation on the basis of
sexual orientation also deny equal protection of law?350 It does so for
the same reason that enforcement of racially restrictive covenants de-
nies equal protection of law. Recognizing and enforcing a right to
deny access to the marketplace to someone just because they are gay
denies access to the public world where we all make a living and ac-
quire the goods and services we need to survive. Not only does it in-
flict economic harm, but it imposes painful and irremediable dignity
harms.351
350. For the Authors’ prior work on the injustice of sexual orientation and other
forms of discrimination in public accommodations, see Saidel-Goley, supra note 5;
Singer, Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 312; Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra
note 52; Joseph Singer, Property and Equality: Public Accommodations and the Con-
stitution in South Africa and the United States, 12 S. AFRICAN J. PUBLIC L. 53 (1997);
SINGER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 307; Joseph William Singer, Property and
Sovereignty Imbricated, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming, 2017); Joseph
William Singer, Should We Call Ahead? Property, Democracy, & the Rule of Law, 5
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY CONF. J. 1 (2016).
351. The Authors’ approach avoids the worry of Mark D. Rosen that all contract
enforcement would automatically be subject to constitutional equality norms if court
enforcement of a contract is always state action by shifting attention to what constitu-
tional equality requires as a substantive normative matter rather than asking whether
the state has acted. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided?
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Singer Audra McDonald explained it best. After Indiana passed a
law expressly granting owners of public accommodations the power to
cite their religious beliefs as a reason to deny service to LGBTQ per-
sons, first she tweeted: “Some in my band are gay & we have 2 gigs in
your state next month. Should we call ahead to make sure the hotel
accepts us all?”352  She then tweeted: “or maybe I should fire my gay
band members just to be on the safe side.”353
The issue is not simply whether one can obtain service, but whether
one must suffer the humiliation of being turned away because one is
not “worthy” of being treated as a human being.354 In the context of
the Fair Housing Act, civil rights damages are available if a landlord
refuses to rent to a prospective tenant because of that tenant’s race
even if the tenant suffers no economic harm because the tenant goes
across the street after the housing denial and finds an apartment that
is bigger, nicer, cheaper, and with a nonracist landlord. The legal sys-
tem awards significant damages to the wronged tenant because what is
at issue is not merely the ability to obtain the things necessary to live,
but the ability to live daily in the public market without being deni-
grated, demeaned, shamed, abased, belittled, humiliated, mortified,
and excluded due to aspects of one’s identity that are legally irrelevant
to the market transaction at issue.
This does not mean that owners have no right to the protections
provided by trespass law. It does not mean that the Constitution regu-
lates whom an owner can invite to their dinner party. It does not mean
that the Constitution says who your friends can be. That is because the
Constitution protects freedom of association and privacy, and it allows
citizens the room to choose their intimate relations and their friends in
the private sphere of the home and in the church, mosque, or
synagogue.355
Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2007). For the opposite view, see
Horowitz, supra note 293, at 209 (“whenever, and however, a state gives legal conse-
quences to transactions between private persons there is ‘state action’—i.e., that the
definition by a state of legal relations between private persons is, for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a matter of  ‘state action.’”); id. (“There is state action in
the definition and enforcement of the right-duty relationship, and there is state action
in adjudicating that there is no right-duty relationship”).
352. Michael Paulson, Audra McDonald Takes to Twitter to Criticize Indiana Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/audra-mc
donald-takes-to-twitter-to-criticize-indiana-law/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/36GQ-KYQ
S].
353. Id.
354. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2575 (2015) (noting that
the object of the 1964 public accommodations law was “the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments,”
quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quot-
ing S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16–17 (1964)).
355. See Henkin, supra note  258, at 498 (“the state may not forbid a person to
whimsical or capricious in his social relations or as to whom he will admit to his
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But, the right of association and the right of privacy does not entail
the conclusion that places open to the general public must be treated
the same as a private home. Homes and businesses are situated differ-
ently; the social context matters.356 Public accommodations are part of
the public world to which free and democratic societies grant equal
opportunity and access. One does not have to belong to a privileged
class or caste to enter the market or obtain private property. One does
not have to profess a particular religion, have a particular skin color,
ancestry or sex, to get a job, rent an apartment, or buy a cake. One
does not have to have a particular set of abilities. And now that the
Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution protects liberty,
equality, and dignity for all persons regardless of their sexual orienta-
tion, people do not have to be straight to be qualified to eat at a res-
taurant. Free and democratic societies do not recognize ascribed
statuses; that means that such societies cannot delegate power to pub-
lic accommodation owners to establish such castes by means of their
private property rights.
The fact that federal and state statutes regulate public accommoda-
tions does not mean that the Constitution itself does not also require
equal access to the marketplace. The state action doctrine posed an
unnecessary and unwarranted bar to the recognition of the ways equal
protection of law applies to common law property and contract rights.
And if the Authors are right that common law is part of the “law” for
which the Fourteenth Amendment requires “equal protection,” then
those statutes can be interpreted as implementing constitutional
norms.
Additionally, sincere religious belief cannot provide a defense to
the requirement that public accommodations serve the public in a
nondiscriminatory fashion.357 If that were so, then the law could not
prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion in public accommoda-
tions. If an owner can invoke their religious beliefs as a reason not to
serve a customer in a public accommodation, then an owner can claim
that selling goods to Jews ratifies their failure to accept Jesus as their
home”); James R. Oleske, Jr., Doric Columns Are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes, the
Ministerial Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV. 142 (2015)
(arguing that the courts have created a fairly consistent and clear line distinguishing
areas of family and religious life where discrimination is allowed and areas of com-
merce and market relations where it is prohibited and not subject to exemptions
based on religious belief).
356. See Henkin, supra note 258, at 498–99 (explaining the difference between the
home and the store).
357. See James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the
Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 99 (2015) (explaining why religious exemptions from public
accommodation laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination are no more war-
ranted than those that would allow racial discrimination); Sepper, supra note 229 (ex-
plaining why religious liberties do not justify exemptions from public accommodation
laws).
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savior. It would allow an owner to refuse to serve Christians on the
ground that they are uncharitable to LGBTQ persons. If religion is a
sufficient reason to act in a discriminatory manner, then religious dis-
crimination must be allowed. Yet, no one has suggested that the word
“religion” be excised from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so that relig-
ious discrimination could become freely available both in public ac-
commodations and employment. In addition, if religion could justify
discrimination, racial segregation would have continued in the South
after 1964 based on the sincere religious beliefs of hotel, restaurant,
and entertainment owners.358 The Constitution grants a high degree of
protection for religious exercise, but those protections do not entitle
individuals to institutionalize discriminatory refusals in public accom-
modations, housing, and employment. This is precisely because our
society privileges equality and liberty and because we have no estab-
lished religion. Religion takes a back seat to the norm of equal access
to the marketplace.
The Constitution does not require that all types of property be
treated alike.359 In the private home, one can choose their associates
freely but public accommodations are subject to a general obligation
to allow access without regard to race, religion, disability, national ori-
gin, sex, and, yes, to sexual orientation and gender identity. When the
state enforces trespass law by excluding someone from a private
home, the state is acting; when it excludes someone from a public ac-
commodation, it is also acting. Whether the state requires discrimina-
tion or allows discrimination, the state is acting. What matters is not
whether the state acted; what matters is whether the state denied equal
protection of law.360 Enforcing a homeowner’s discriminatory wishes
about whom to invite to dinner does not deny equal protection of law;
enforcing a restaurant’s refusal to serve a gay couple does.361 What
358. See Newman v. Piggie Par Enters., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966), aff’d in
relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d and
modified on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (rejecting the argument that religious
belief could justify racial discrimination in a restaurant); SINGER, RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY, supra note 307; Singer, Property and Sovereignty Imbricated, supra note 350;
Singer, Should We Call Ahead?, supra note 350.
359. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 506 (“eliminating the concept of state action
would not mean that private parties always would be held to the same institutional
standards as the government” given constitutionally protected liberty interests such as
freedom of association).
360. See Minow, supra note 83, at 164 (”The state action doctrine, and the distinc-
tion between what should be viewed as public and what as private, embed normative
choices inside definitions without clarifying what is at stake for society.”); Schmidt,
supra note 133, at 599 (quoting Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 249 (1963)
(Harlan, J., concurring)) (“The critical question . . .  [is] not whether there is state
action or not [but whether] ‘the State’s involvement in an arbitrary discrimination is
such that it should be held responsible for the discrimination.’”).
361. See Black, supra note 15, at 100–01 (noting the Equal Protection Clause is
compatible with preservation of “private life” while requiring access to the more pub-
lic world of lunch counters, housing developments, and community swimming pools).
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matters is not state action; what matters is what it means to ensure
equal liberty in a free and democratic society that recognizes the equal
dignity of each human being.362
V. CONCLUSION
Arresting a person constitutes state action. Prosecuting a person
constitutes state action. Imposing a criminal sanction constitutes state
action. But further, threatening to use the coercive powers of the state
to keep a person from entering the marketplace by delegating the
power to owners of public accommodations to treat that person as a
second-class citizen not entitled to buy a shirt or flowers, eat in a res-
taurant, book a hotel room, or rent property also constitutes state ac-
tion.363 It does not matter that the discriminatory motive originates in
the owner of the public accommodation rather than a state official.
Telling citizens that they cannot enter public accommodations if the
owners do not wish to treat them as equal citizens puts the coercive
power of the state on the side of exclusion, denial of goods and ser-
vices, and enforcement of a social caste system.
What matters is not whether the state acted but whether its laws pro-
vide for equal treatment in the spheres of social life to which a free and
democratic society guarantees access, liberty, and dignity. Just socie-
ties ensure both liberty and equality. The time has long since passed
when those values could be reasonably interpreted to allow invidious
discrimination in public accommodations. The right to discriminate
based on race in a public accommodation is not a property entitlement
that a free and democratic society can recognize—at least if it is true
to its foundational values. The same applies to LGBTQ persons. Gay
and lesbian persons—and all LGBTQ persons—are human beings.
The state must treat human beings with dignity and must respect their
equal worth and liberty.
The right to exclude from a public accommodation because of sex-
ual orientation is a property right that is characteristic of a society that
does not treat persons with equal concern and respect. It does not
reflect a principle of equal liberty. It is not a property right that can be
362. See Chemerinksy, supra note 8, at 506 (framing the question as whether free
association or privacy interests should or should not prevail over equality claims in
particular social contexts); id. at 540 (“Liberty would best be protected if the courts
openly articulated the competing interests that they were balancing”); Henkin, supra
note 258, at 492 (exploring when “liberty claims” override “equal protection” claims);
Schmidt, supra note 133, at 601–602 (“the [state action] doctrine’s surface concern
with the relatively mechanical, content-neutral linkages between official state actors
and private actors fails to capture—or worse, obscures—the fundamental constitu-
tional values at stake.”); Tribe, supra note 7, at 30 ( “The doctrine of equal dignity
signals the beginning of the end for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in areas like employment and housing, which remains legal in many states and has yet
to be expressly banned in federal legislation.”).
363. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927)
(characterizing property rights as delegations of sovereign power).
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validly recognized by a constitutional democracy. The Supreme Court
long ago recognized that “the power of the State to create and enforce
property interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”364 A common law rule that empowers
owners of public accommodations to refuse service or to provide dis-
criminatory services is an act of state, and is not consistent with the
principle that all human beings are created equal.
Human beings are entitled to dignity. We have no social castes in
the United States. People should not have to call ahead to see if they
are welcome in public spaces; they should not have to wonder whether
they will be able to enter the marketplace to attain the things they
need to live when they move to another state. Public accommodations
serve the public, and LGBTQ persons are part of the public. The Con-
stitution limits the property rights that can be recognized and en-
forced. Only a right to the privileges and benefits of public
accommodations without regard to sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity is consistent with the Constitution’s “full promise of liberty.”365
364. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
365. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
